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Abstract
Reconfigurable Antennas for Wireless Network Security
Prathaban Mookiah
Kapil R. Dandekar, Ph.D.
Large scale proliferation of wireless technology coupled with the increasingly hos-
tile information security landscape is of serious concern as organizations continue to
widely adopt wireless networks to access and distribute critical and confidential in-
formation. Private users also face more risks than ever as they exchange more and
more sensitive information over home and public networks through their ubiquitous
wireless-enabled laptops and hand held devices. The fundamental broadcast nature
of wireless data transmission aggravates the situation, since unlike wired networks,
it introduces multiple avenues for attack and penetration into a network. Though
several traditional mechanisms do exist to protect wireless networks against threats,
such schemes are a carryover from the traditional wire based systems. Hence vulner-
abilities continue to exist, and have been repeatedly demonstrated to be susceptible
to failure under different circumstances.
The resulting uncertainties have led to a significant paradigm shift in the design
and implementation of wireless security in recent times, among which wireless chan-
nel based security schemes have shown the most promise. Channel based security
schemes are rooted on the simple fact that a legitimate user and an adversary cannot
be physically co-located and hence the underlying multi-path structure corresponding
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to the two links cannot be the same. However most wireless systems are constrained
in terms of bandwidth, power and number of transceivers, which seriously limit the
performance of such channel based security implementations. To overcome these lim-
itations, this thesis proposes a new dimension to the channel based security approach
by introducing the capabilities of reconfigurable antennas. The main objective of
this work is to demonstrate that the ability of reconfigurable antennas to generate
different channel realizations that are uncorrelated between different modes will lead
to significant improvements in intrusion detection rates.
To this end, two different schemes that make use of channels generated by a re-
configurable antenna are proposed and evaluated through measurements. The first
scheme is based on associating a channel based fingerprint to the legitimate user to
prevent intrusion. The three main components of this scheme are i) a fingerprint
derived from the different modes of the antenna, ii) a metric to compare two finger-
prints and iii) a hypothesis test based on the proposed metric to classify intruders
and legitimate transmitters. The second scheme relies on monitoring the statistics of
the channels for the legitimate transmitters’ links since any intrusion will result in an
observable change in the channel’s statistics. The problem is posed as a generalized
likelihood ratio test (GLRT) which responds to any change in the channel statistics
by a large spike in the likelihood ratio’s value. The detector’s performance is studied
as a function of pattern correlation coefficient for both schemes to provide insights
on designing appropriate antenna modes for better performance.
Moreover this thesis takes a holistic approach to studying the antenna based secu-
rity schemes. A novel channel modeling approach which combines the cluster chan-
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nel model and site specific ray tracer results is proposed and validated to facilitate
the analysis of such schemes through simulations without resorting to comprehen-
sive channel measurements. This approach is motivated by the lack of an intuitive
and simple channel model to study systems that use reconfigurable antennas for any
application.
Finally the design of a metamaterial based substrate that can help miniaturize
antenna arrays and reconfigurable antennas is presented. The magnetic permeability
enhanced metamaterial’s capability to miniaturize an antenna’s size while maintain-
ing an acceptable level of isolation between elements in an array is experimentally
demonstrated. The benefits gained in a wireless communication system that uses
a patch antenna arrray built on this substrate is quantified in terms of mean effec-
tive gain, correlation between the antennas and channel capacity through channel
measurements.
Despite their capability to significantly improve spectral efficiency, the widespread
adoption of reconfigurable antennas in wireless devices has been hampered by their
complexity, cost and size. The work presented in this thesis is therefore intended to
serve as a catalyst to the widespread adoption of reconfigurable antenna technology
by i) adding value to such antennas by utilizing them for enhancing system security
and ii) providing a mechanism to miniaturize them to facilitate their integration into
modern space constrained wireless devices.
1Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Large scale proliferation of wireless technology coupled with the increasingly hos-
tile information security landscape is of serious concern. The fundamental broadcast
nature of wireless data transmission aggravates the situation, since unlike wired net-
works, it introduces multiple avenues for attack and penetration into a network. Risks
will continue to increase in number and sophistication as wireless networks continue
to carry more sensitive information. Hence, the challenge of providing the essential
security services of authentication, access control, confidentiality, integrity and non-
repudiation creates unique challenges to the designers and administrators of wireless
networks [1, 2]. Though several traditional mechanisms do exist to protect wireless
networks against threats, they have been repeatedly demonstrated to be vulnera-
ble and susceptible to failure under different circumstances [3, 4]. Among the many
novel techniques that have been devised in recent times to secure a wireless link,
channel based intrusion detection has shown a lot of promise for a variety of reasons
as discussed in Chapter 2.
Figure 1.1 depicts a problem that is representative of one that is solved by channel
based intrusion detection schemes. Transmitter T and receiver R have established a
connection and are in the process of exchanging information. Adversary I eavesdrops
into this connection and waits till he gathers sufficient information to spoof T. A sur-
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Figure 1.1: Illustration of the problem that is solved by channel based intrusion
detection schemes. (a) T eavesdrops on a data transfer session between R and
T to obtain sensitive information about T’s identity. (b) After obtaining the
information, I tries to masquerade as T to R.
prisingly large number of vulnerabilities exist in modern wireless access technologies
that allow I to obtain this information with relative ease [1, 2]. Once this information
is obtained, I launches a spoofing attack by posing as T to R. This spoofing attack
can serve as the means to gain entry into the network, hijack T’s connection with R,
launch a man-in-the-middle attack on the connection between T and R among many
other possibilities.
A channel based solution to this problem is rooted on the simple fact that the
legitimate user T and the adversary I cannot be physically co-located. It is well
known that the wireless channel begins to decorrelate at distances greater than a half
wavelength in space [5, 6]. This fundamental phenomena forms the basis on which
3the legitimate user and an adversary are differentiated.
The channel based intrusion detection scheme provides a solution to this problem
by letting R assign T a channel based fingerprint fRT during the onset of commu-
nications [7–11]. Since channel information is available at R on a packet by packet
basis for equalization purposes, with minimal overhead he can also verify the identity
of the transmitter by comparing this fingerprint to the stored fingerprint. As shown
in Fig. 1.2, due to their different physical locations, the multipath structures of the
wireless channel corresponding to I and T will also be different, and hence it poses a
major challenge for I to match his fingerprint fRI with fRT . Therefore even after T’s
identity is compromised, I will not be able to spoof him.
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Figure 1.2: Illustration of the channel based intrusion detection scheme. The
channel based fingerprint corresponding to T and I will be different at R due to
their different physical locations. This difference in fingerprint is used to prevent
I from spoofing T’s identity.
4Though the preceding simplistic solution appears to work well in theory, there are
a few fundamental problems that render it to be less effective in practice:
• Wireless channels are inherently time variant [5, 6]. Hence a practically direct
comparison of the fingerprint fRT with the incoming packets’ fingerprint is not
feasible. Therefore the comparison has be performed based on the statistics of
fRT rather than a point value. This approach will naturally lead to finite levels
of false alarms for T and missed detections of I.
• To achieve better detection rates and to prevent the adversary I from circum-
venting this scheme through simple power control methods, higher dimensional
channel information is required. In most current wireless applications this is
usually obtained in the form of channel estimates corresponding to several fre-
quencies (sub-carriers) [12]. However most current wireless applications also
have lower bandwidths. Wireless channels within a narrow frequency band
tend to be highly correlated which leads to the different elements in the chan-
nel information to be highly correlated as well, thus significantly reducing their
efficacy in the security scheme.
• Channel estimates can never be perfect in the presence of noise, which unfortu-
nately is omnipresent. Therefore channel based intrusion detection schemes tend
to work well mostly under high SNR conditions which require higher transmit
power levels and is not a condition that can be present in all practical situations.
5Reconfigurable Antennas
Existing work that has explored the idea of channel based intrusion detection are
based on the use of conventional single antenna systems [7–11]. Whereas bandwidth
and transmit power levels are determined by the application, the antenna is restricted
only by its design. Hence an antenna based solution to the intrusion detection problem
can give the system designer increased fidelity in terms of controlling the scheme’s
performance.
Significant progress has been made in the design of reconfigurable antennas result-
ing in numerous designs that are reconfigurable in frequency, pattern, polarization or
a combination of these parameters [13]. The different modes of the reconfigurable
antenna results in uncorrelated channel realizations that yield high levels of diversity
gain in a multi-path rich wireless medium. This ability to improve spectral efficiency
is a keenly sought after feature in new and emerging high data rate applications and
has fueled intense interest in reconfigurable antennas which has led to their gradual
incorporation in commercial wireless systems [14].
Introducing such antennas with multiple modes into channel based intrusion de-
tection schemes (Fig. 1.3) holds great potential to enhance such schemes due to two
main reasons:
• A reconfigurable antenna expands the dimensionality of the fingerprint through
the channel realizations corresponding to its different modes.
• Due to the different multi-path structures associated with each mode of the
antenna as shown in Fig. 1.3, the different channel realizations will also be
6decorrelated to an arbitrary extent that results in a richer description of the
physical link.
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Figure 1.3: Illustration of the reconfigurable antenna based intrusion detec-
tion scheme. Different antenna modes yield different channels for T and I. This
multidimensional information can be used to form a more robust fingerprint to
differentiate between I and T.
In many public open networks (e.g. coffee shops) higher level authentication solu-
tions are usually not implemented. Freely available software tools such as Firesheep
can be used to execute simple session hijacking attacks when users visit insecure
websites in such networks [15]. A wireless access point equipped with reconfigurable
antennas that can implement the proposed security schemes can be used to pro-
vide a layer of security that can significantly alleviate these security threats in such
networks. In networks with higher level security mechanisms for encryption, authen-
tication and integrity, the proposed schemes can complement those mechanisms while
7they continue to play their part in securing the wireless link.
From the perspective of reconfigurable antenna technology, despite the benefits
they bring to a wireless system, they have not become a mainstay in wireless devices
mainly due to their complexity and cost. Utilizing them as a tool to strengthen the
overall security will significantly add value of the antenna and will thus contribute
immensely to its widespread adoption in commercial wireless devices.
Therefore, the mutual benefits that are created for each other by marrying the
concepts of channel based intrusion detection and reconfigurable antennas form the
main motivation for this thesis.
1.2 Contributions of This Thesis
The work presented in this thesis takes a holistic approach and focuses on the vari-
ous aspects of reconfigurable antenna based intrusion detection in wireless networks.
Figure 1.4 illustrates the interconnections between the four different areas of contri-
butions made by this thesis. Reconfigurable antenna designs and their application
for channel based security form the two major components of this work. The meta-
material substrate serves to complement reconfigurable antenna and array designs by
providing a mechanism to miniaturize them to suit the needs of space constrained
wireless systems. The hybrid channel modeling technique is developed to provide the
means to accurately study the reconfigurable antenna based security schemes through
simulations. These contributions taken together can be used to i) enhance security in
current and future WLAN technologies including the 802.11 standards and handheld
wireless systems and ii) miniaturize reconfigurable antennas and arrays.
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Figure 1.4: The four main areas of contribution of the thesis.
Techniques for Reconfigurable Antenna Based Security
Two disparate methods that utilize reconfigurable antennas to detect intrusion are
developed. Fingerprint based authentication is based on associating a channel
based fingerprint for the legitimate user. This is the first study that extends such an
approach to exploit the capabilities of a reconfigurable antenna. In order to exploit
these unique capabilities, a novel authentication metric derived from the channel
responses corresponding to the different antennas modes is proposed and studied.
Channel based generalized likelihood ratio (GLR) test for intrusion detec-
tion is a scheme that monitors for any abrupt changes in the channel statistics to
detect intrusion. While the two schemes differ in many aspects which makes them
suitable for different usage scenarios, the most important difference lies in the appli-
cation of the channel information, where the former method operates on the statistics
of the distances between channel based fingerprints while the later relies on directly
9observing the statistics of the channel for detecting intrusion. The performance and
various operational aspects of the two schemes with a fixed as well as a reconfigurable
antenna system are analyzed through measurements obtained from channel sounding
experiments. Due to quality of service (QoS) requirements and power constraints,
it will be possible only to use a small number of antenna modes for security pur-
poses. This thesis therefore provides an analysis on the relationship between
antenna modes and the schemes’ performance, which addresses the question
of how to design antennas such that the best possible performance is achieved. The
contributions under this section appear in [16–19].
Framework for Simulating Channel Based Security Schemes
Most wireless modeling techniques do not extend well to perform site specific sim-
ulations of wireless systems equipped with reconfigurable antennas and match them
with measured results. Such a model is imperative for successfully evaluating antenna
based security schemes. In this thesis, a hybrid channel model that combines the
features of ray tracing and the cluster channel model and suitable for evaluating the
proposed security schemes through simulations is developed. This general model,
which can be used to study any application that uses reconfigurable antennas, is
validated by comparing simulated results for a given environment with channel mea-
surements taken in the same environment. The channel model appears in [20].
Reconfigurable Antenna Array Designs
A reconfigurable antenna array design is presented. A reconfigurable spiral an-
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tenna array that exploits different active regions as well as mutual coupling between
two closely spaced elements to achieve pattern diversity is developed. It’s ability to
enhance MIMO system performance is quantified through channel measurements.
The reconfigurable antenna design presented in this thesis as well as other design
contributions appear in [21–25].
Metatmaterial Based Substrate for Antenna Miniaturization
Besides their complexity, another factor that has hindered the widespread adoption
of reconfigurable antennas in wireless devices is their larger footprint. A metatmate-
rial based substrate for antenna miniaturization is developed and it’s potential
to significantly miniaturize antennas and antenna arrays without sacrificing system
performance is demonstrated. The metamaterial substrate appears in [26, 27].
1.3 Layout and Organization
This thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 reviews the nature of wireless security, currently known threats and
solutions and the need for non traditional approaches to security. The significance
of physical layer based security is introduced and existing work on this subject is
reviewed.
Chapter 3 provides an introduction to reconfigurable antennas. The different tech-
niques that have been pursued to achieve reconfiguration are compared. Literature
that discusses different design approaches is reviewed .
A reconfigurable spiral antenna is presented in Chapter 4. The traditional ben-
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efit of pattern reconfiguration in terms of improving spectral efficiency is quantified
through simulations and field measurements by using this antenna in a 2 × 2 MIMO
system.
The first of the reconfigurable antenna based security scheme is presented in Chap-
ter 5. The preliminaries of the scheme are introduced and its performance is studied
via measurements in an indoor environment. The chapter also analyzes the relation-
ship between the radiation patterns corresponding to different antenna modes and
the performance of the scheme. The results of this analysis is used to draw guidelines
to pick a suitable reconfigurable antenna for security applications.
The GLRT based security scheme is the subject of Chapter 6. The operation of the
scheme is introduced and its performance is studied via measurements in an indoor
environment. Again, the relationship between the radiation patterns corresponding
to different antenna modes and the performance is analyzed for this scheme as well.
The hybrid channel model developed to study reconfigurable antenna based wire-
less applications is presented in Chapter 7. The principles of the modeling method,
the method of application as well its validation process are discussed in this chapter.
The metamaterial substrate for antenna miniaturization is the focus of Chapter
8. The benefits of the substrate and a comprehensive performance analysis of an
antenna array built on this substrate is presented.
Finally Chapter 9 concludes this thesis by summarizing the work. System level
implications of the different contributions are discussed. Exciting possibilities that
exist for future research in areas addressed in this thesis are pointed out.
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Chapter 2: The Problem of Wireless Security
Network security in general deals with defining security policies, implementing proac-
tive security measures to enforce these policies, monitoring the network to identify
anomalies, mitigating threats and reviewing adversarial acts in order to improve ex-
isting security [28, 29]. Although the overall security objectives for a wireless network
remains the same as wired networks, the “open-to-all” medium greatly increases the
risk of interception and dramatically alters the security landscape [1, 2]. The objec-
tive of this chapter is to give a brief overview of i) threats and attacks in wireless
networks, ii) current approaches to wireless security and their shortcomings and iii)
recent approaches to wireless security. As the techniques developed in this thesis per-
tain to fixed terminal wireless applications, the focus of this discussion will be based
on wireless local area networks.
2.1 Threats and Attacks in WLANs
Most of the unique vulnerabilities in wireless networks is caused by the medium.
Threats due to these vulnerabilities in safeguarding confidentiality, integrity, and
maintaining availability are numerous and come in many forms. Several forms of
such security threats are currently known. Important threats include [1]:1
• Network Sniffing: Sniffing is the process of intercepting and recording traffic
1While discussing threats, the usage scenario is assumed to consist of a wireless access point
(AP) that is connected to the organizational network backbone and users who connect to this AP
to access the network.
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by anyone other than the intended receiver. Though not an active form of
attack, adversaries can use the gathered information to launch more sophisti-
cated attacks. A plethora of free and commercial software exists that can be
used by malicious entities to record frames, service set identifiers (SSID), and
MAC addresses (e.g. Kismet [30], Aircrack-ng [31] and AirSNORT [32]).
• Spoofing Attacks: In spoofing attacks, a malicious adversary poses as a legiti-
mate user in order to gain access to a wireless network. Usually the adversary
eavesdrops on an active connection between a legitimate user and an access
point for a duration of time, till he manages to obtain sufficient information
that allows him to spoof the user. Information that can be spoofed include
MAC addresses, IP addresses and entire data frames [33].
• Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks: The adversary manages to place himself
between the legitimate user and the access point. Subsequent transmissions
from the transmitter are intercepted by the adversary and a different set of
malicious messages are transmitted back to the receiver. For e.g. the collection
of tools called AirJack [34] includes the program monkey jack that enables a
MITM attack in a WLAN.
• Session Hijacking: A severe threat, where the adversary hijacks an established
session away from its proper owner [35]. Usually a spoofing attack would also be
involved in order to trick the access point into believing it is still communicating
with the original owner of the session. Once the session is taken over, it can be
used by the adversary for various malicious acts. Though the attack is carried
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out in real-time, the adversary can maintain the session for an extended period
of time afterwards.
• Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks: The adversary causes the wireless network to
become unavailable to legitimate users [36]. Though DoS attacks can target
any layer in the protocol stack, wireless specific DoS attacks are carried out by
transmitting an external jamming signal with a high power level towards the
access point which renders all legitimate transmissions useless. DoS attacks are
one of the most difficult type of attacks to mitigate in wireless networks since
there is very little the upper layer mechanisms can do to thwart the attack.
• Replay Attacks: The attacker captures packets corresponding to the authenti-
cation process of a session and replays it at a later time to establish back the
same session [37].
• Protocol Specific Attacks: Besides the general modes of attack, a variety of
protocol vulnerabilities have also been exploited to attack wireless networks.
Examples include the caffe-latte attack [38], FMS attack, KoreK attack, PTW
attack and Chopchop attack [39].
2.2 Current Approaches to Wireless Security
Current solutions to mitigating threats in wireless networks follow two major ap-
proaches. The first approach focuses on providing mechanisms to protect individual
links through encryption and authentication. The second approach relies on more
sophisticated site-wide intrusion detection systems.
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2.2.1 Encryption and Authentication
One of the earliest security protocols developed exclusively for 802.11 compliant wire-
less networks is the wired equivalent privacy (WEP) algorithm [1, 40]. WEP uses a
secret key that is shared between the AP and terminal for encrypting packets. The 40-
bit or 128-bit keys are based on a RC4 stream cipher [41]. To maintain data integrity
so that any modifications to the ciphertext en route is detected, a CRC-32 based
checksum is employed. Two authentication modes are provided: an open authentica-
tion where any user is allowed to access the network and a shared key authentication
system which uses a shared secret key and a challenge-response handshake method.
However WEP has been marred with too many security vulnerabilities [3, 4, 39, 42].
It has been shown that WEP keys can be recovered with ease from statistical analy-
sis of a sufficient number of captured data frames. Authentication can also be easily
overridden by exploiting certain vulnerabilities [3]. WEP is no longer recommended
for use unless in conjunction with VPNs.
Subsequently Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) and later WPA2 (802.11i) were in-
troduced by the Wi-Fi alliance that addressed many of WEP’s vulnerabilities [40].
WPA’s features include 802.1x authentication which provides better authentication,
the temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP), which addresses the weak key attack
problems, and message integrity codes (MIC), which provides better data integrity.
Unlike WEP that uses a master key for authentication and encryption, TKIP changes
the key for every packet to combat statistical methods to analyze the cipher which
was the most glaring weakness of WEP. Even if the intruder obtains the security key,
16
he will not be able to use it for a long period of time. Authentication in WPA has
two flavors: 802.1x and pre-share keys (PSK). 802.1x implements two layers of iden-
tity verification. The first is done using a shared secret key at the access point and
the second by checking against a locally stored database or external authentication
services such as RADIUS or Kerberos. PSK on the other hand is a simpler solution
where authentication is performed using a key that is previously shared between the
two ends.
The major change made in WPA2 was doing away with the RC4 steam cipher
in favor of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) - Counter Mode with Cipher
Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol (CCMP) which is considered
the most robust method for encryption among all existing wireless standards [41].
2.2.2 Wireless Intruder Detection Systems (WIDS)
The other protection mechanism used mainly in organizations with large wireless
networks is WIDS. WIDS operate by monitoring the spectrum for abnormal traffic
to detect rogue devices in the network [43, 44]. They consist a network of individual
sensors that are capable of collecting all the traffic on the airwaves and analyzing
them for intrusion. Based on the capabilities of the WIDS, certain systems can only
perform analysis in the oﬄine mode based on the captured and stored traffic, while
the more expensive systems are capable of performing the analysis online. WIDS
can be categorized based on their detection approach as signature based or anomaly
based. Signature based systems monitor for traffic that fit patterns of known attacks.
Comprehensive pattern classification algorithms have been designed to successfully
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detect known attacks with a high probability of detection. In anomaly based methods,
a model for normal traffic is developed during the initial training stages based on
which abnormal traffic is filtered out. Anomaly based approaches are less frequently
implemented due to the high rate of false alarms, though they are capable of detecting
any hitherto unknown kind of attacks.
Although WIDS based solutions can be relatively more effective, only a handful of
vendors currently provide these solutions (e.g. AirDefense [45], AirMagnet [46], Red-
M [47]) and deployment is usually very costly due to the required sensor overlays
on existing infrastructure. Deploying an effective system also requires studying and
modeling site specific traffic which contributes immensely to cost and time.
Despite these ongoing efforts, most wireless security schemes are a carryover from
the traditional wire based systems. Hence vulnerabilities continue to exist, and have
been repeatedly demonstrated to be susceptible to failure under different circum-
stances [39]. Yet one of the striking characteristics of most widely adopted security
mechanisms is that, they are not designed specifically for the wireless medium such
that the unique characteristics of the medium are exploited to enhance security.
2.3 Physical Layer Based Approaches to Wireless Security
The lingering vulnerabilities and uncertainties in the wireless security landscape have
led to a significant paradigm shift in the design and implementation of wireless se-
curity in recent times, where an increasingly cross-layer approach is being pursued
to protect wireless networks. Research in wireless security is actively looking into
introducing multiple levels of defense at different layers of the protocol stack. Among
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the different layers, the physical layer has attracted the most attention due to several
reasons:
• The unique characteristics of the wireless medium is manifested only at the
physical layer. Hence it seems logical that any medium specific property that
can be exploited to improve security be implemented at the physical layer.
• The ability to recognize adversarial behavior at the lowest layer provides an
informed warning for the higher layer security schemes to become more aware
of the threat and thus improve the effectiveness in securing wireless links.
• Utilizing the physical layer for the additional purpose of security adds tangible
value to the associated hardware.
In literature authors often refer to encrypting and authenticating based on lower
level protocols such as WPA2 as well as WIDS as physical layer security techniques.
This thesis makes a clear distinction between physical layer security and physical
layer based security. Physical layer based security relies on explicitly exploiting the
characteristics of the wireless medium to enhance security while physical layer security
merely provides some standard security mechanisms at this layer.
Certain forms of physical layer based security have been in existence since early
times in wireless communications. Smart antennas with directional beamforming
capabilities can be thought of as a rudimentary mode of physical layer based security
as it focuses the signal only toward the intended users [48, 49]. Spread spectrum
techniques such as CDMA, though designed primarily for efficient spectrum sharing,
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provide a certain degree of security as well [50]. Similarly frequency hopping, whose
main purpose is to avoid interference, also provides a basic level of protection against
simple threats [51]. However such mechanisms are effective only against very casual
adversaries without any serious intent.
In recent times more deliberate security methods have been proposed at the phys-
ical layer. These methods can be categorized into four different groups: information
theoretic approaches, power based methods, signal watermarking and channel based
methods.
• Information Theoretic Approaches: The concept of the wire-tap channel was
first introduced in [52] which provided a theoretical framework to prevent an
adversary from eavesdropping into an connection even without data encryption
while maximizing the rate of transmission from the source to the legitimate
receiver. This seminal work has inspired a vast amount of research in the
literature that provide theoretical bounds for transmission rates and information
secrecy under a variety of usage scenarios and channel conditions [53].
• Power Based Methods: These methods rely on precise power control to thwart
the adversary. Different techniques under this category include the use of di-
rectional antennas, cooperative beamforming for secure long distance commu-
nications using relay nodes and jamming techniques where carefully designed
artificial noise is transmitted along with the message to confound the eaves-
dropper while still being able to be received by the intended receiver [54–56].
• Signal Watermarking: Signal watermarking relies on embedding additional in-
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formation to the data signal to provide additional information only to the in-
tended receiver. Though research in watermarking was originally intended for
minimizing distortion of multimedia content, several researchers have extended
this concept to transmit additional authentication information to the receiver
in a stealthy manner [57–59].
• Channel Based Methods: In this class of methods, the time domain or frequency
domain response of the wireless channel between the transmitter and receiver
is at the heart of the security scheme. The work reported in this thesis falls
under this category and hence the following section describes it in more detail.
2.4 Channel Based Methods for Wireless Security
Channel based methods encompass security techniques that truly and directly utilize
the characteristics of the wireless channel. The unique mode(s) of energy propaga-
tion between a transmitter and receiver in a multi-path rich environment, which is
manifested in the time domain or frequency domain response of the wireless chan-
nel, provides the core information based on which security schemes are devised. The
channel response information has several properties that makes it a strong candidate
to be considered for security purposes:
• The wireless channel is reciprocal and therefore serves as a naturally occurring
shared information source for the two communicating entities.
• The channel is unique between the transmitter and receiver and it is impossible
for an adversary physically located elsewhere to mimic this channel exactly.
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Thus the channel serves as a secure source of shared information.
• Channel response information is ubiquitous in modern wireless systems since
it is required on a packet by packet basis for equalization purposes. Hence
additional overhead processes need not to be implemented to obtain it.
Currently devised channel based methods can be subdivided into two broad cat-
egories: channel based key generation and channel based authentication.
2.4.1 Channel Based Key Generation
Channel based key encryption schemes utilize channel response information to gener-
ate and share encryption keys [60–65]. Wireless channels including the transmitting
and receiving antennas constitute a reciprocal system which holds true across the
temporal, spectral and spatial domains. This reciprocal channel provides a shared
source for the two ends of the communications link to generate a secret key. More-
over the channel is time variant that allows for frequent key regeneration if required.
The intruder being physically located at a different location cannot estimate the ex-
act channel between the legitimate transmitter and receiver and therefore cannot
estimate the same key.
Generating keys based on the wireless channel provides an elegant solution to the
key distribution problem in symmetric key systems. It also eliminates the need for a
public key infrastructure which can be a quite resource intensive in many applications
such as ad-hoc and sensor networks.
Different characteristics of the channel response have been been used to gener-
ate secure keys. Characteristics include received channel amplitude or gain, signal
22
strength (RSSI), fades in signal envelopes, phase, and level crossings. Channels cor-
responding to beam forming antennas have also been studied [66].
The most significant challenge in channel based key generation is the loss of perfect
reciprocity due to the different RF chains at both ends of the link. Hence research
in this area has focused on efficient encoding methods to extract the longest possible
key while maintaining key agreement and reconciliation algorithms to correct for
disagreements. Various metrics have been used to quantify the effectiveness of the
extracted keys such as entropy rate (measure of strength of key), bit generation rate
and bit agreement rate (measures of encoding methods and reciprocity).
In summary, channel based key generation is very promising and barring any un-
foreseen hurdles, should eventually be incorporated into mainstream wireless devices.
2.4.2 Channel Based Authentication
Channel based authentication is rooted on the simple fact that a legitimate user
and an adversary cannot be physically co-located. It is well known that the wireless
channel begins to decorrelate at distances greater than half a wavelength in space
[5, 6]. This fundamental phenomena forms the basis on which the legitimate user and
an adversary are differentiated. The wireless access point associates each legitimate
user with a fingerprint based on the channel between itself and the user and uses this
information to re-authenticate the same user during the course of a session. It should
be noted that these schemes do not attempt to localize the user; rather the channel
based fingerprint serves as an unique identifier associated with the users’ locations.
However channel based authentication should be differentiated from channel based
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ranging schemes where the objective is to use a channel based quantity such as time
difference of arrival [67], angle of arrival [68] and RSSI [69–71] to localize a device.
A fingerprint based on a tuple of measured RSSI values reported by multiple
sensors located at different locations has been used to identify different transmitters
in [7, 8]. In [9], the Euclidean distance between the reference channel frequency
response and the channel that needs to be authenticated is used as the metric to
verify the identity of the transmitter. This approach is extended to time-variant
channels in [10]. In [8, 72], the same approach is used to study the detection of Sybil
attacks in which an adversary claims a large number of identities to deplete system
resources. A similar Euclidean distance based metric is employed in the time domain
for device authentication in [11]. In [73] the authentication metric is based on the
distinct phase bias for the different subcarriers of an OFDM system. However four
significant limitations are to be found in the existing body of work on this subject:
1. These studies reveal that achieving acceptable levels of performance with chan-
nel based schemes require higher dimensional channel information. For e.g.
in [7], RSSI values from multiple sensors are fused to form the channel based
fingerprints. [10] has shown that performance can be significantly improved
through obtaining channel estimates over a wider bandwidth or multiple an-
tennas. However bandwidth is very scarce and limited by the application in
practice. Multiple antennas require significant changes to the RF hardware and
even in systems that are designed to support multiple antenna elements, the
number of such elements are limited to only a few due to cost and space con-
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straints. Hence there is a need to obtain multi-dimensional channel information
by operating within the basic design constraints of the associated hardware.
2. Some of the schemes also require sampling the channel at intervals much shorter
than the channel coherence time in order to obtain good performance levels.
This may not be practically possible in most band-limited applications. Thus
schemes should be devoid of such requirements and be able to perform under
limited availability of channel information.
3. In general, all existing channel based authentication schemes have relied on a
fingerprint based approach. Though this method certainly has its benefits, there
is a significant void in terms of other approaches to channel based authentication
as well.
4. With the exception of [7, 11] that employed simple power based metrics, there
are no reported work based on actual field measurements. Hence there is a need
to quantify channel based authentication schemes through measurement based
data.
The research undertaken in this thesis attempts to address these issues by intro-
ducing reconfigurable antennas to the problem. A reconfigurable antenna offers a
solution to the first limitation by its ability to generate multiple channel realizations
each corresponding to a different mode, while not imposing any additional require-
ment on the bandwidth or number of spatially separated antenna elements. Control
circuits to switch antenna modes can be introduced independent of the underlying
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communications hardware and therefore does not raise major hardware challenges.
As it will be shown in Chapter 5, metrics can be developed such that the inter-mode
channel differences can be exploited to form metrics that yield higher performances
without the need to estimate the channel at rates dictated by its coherence time.
The GLRT method to be discussed in Chapter 6 addresses the limitation posed in
(3) by introducing a completely novel approach to channel based authentication. All
the presented results are quantified through extensive measurements thus providing
a more practical perspective on achievable performance in realtime wireless systems.
2.5 Summary
Wireless networks are subjected to a variety of threats due to the broadcast nature of
the wireless medium. While existing approaches assuage the threats through encryp-
tion, protocol based authentication as well as anomaly and signature based intrusion
detection systems, threats continue to exist. Due to their unique ability to exploit
the characteristics of the wireless medium, research in physical layer based security
schemes has exploded in an attempt to address existing vulnerabilities. Among such
schemes, channel based authentication is the least explored and one of the most
promising areas. Contributions reported in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis will at-
tempt to address some of the current limitations and extend the state of the art in
channel based authentication.
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Chapter 3: Reconfigurable Antennas
Parallel to the developments in physical layer based security for wireless networks,
significant progress has been made in the design of reconfigurable antennas resulting
in numerous designs that are reconfigurable in frequency, pattern, polarization or
a combination of these parameters [13]. For many new and emerging high data
rate applications, reconfigurable antennas are of special interest due to their ability
to generate highly uncorrelated radiation patterns which can produce uncorrelated
channel realizations in a multi-path rich wireless medium. Such antennas have gained
widespread attention due to their ability to improve throughput and are gradually
finding their way into commercial wireless systems [14]. This chapter will briefly
review the different diversity modes provided by reconfigurable antennas, and the
methods for achieving them.
3.1 Diversity Modes
Reconfigurable antennas are designed to exhibit one or more of the following diversity
modes: i) frequency, ii) pattern and iii) polarization [13]. With the exception of
frequency diversity, the common purpose of these diversity modes is to present the
wireless transceiver with different decorrelated diversity branches, each corresponding
to the different states of the reconfigurable antenna. The two traditional goals of
having such diversity branches have been to improve the SNR of the received signal
for increasing throughput and for improving link reliability in environments with high
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Figure 3.1: Two diversity modes commonly implemented in reconfigurable an-
tennas: (a) pattern diversity, and (b) polarization diversity.
levels of interference [6].
Frequency diversity on the other hand has been traditionally used to support
different services, each operating at different frequency bands. Since the primary ob-
jective of using reconfigurable antennas in this research is for their ability to generate
decorrelated channels for a given application, frequency diversity techniques will not
be discussed further.
A fourth mode of diversity also exists; spatial diversity relies on sampling the chan-
nel at different points in space. Reconfigurable antennas are not generally designed
for this form of diversity as it is usually achieved by an array of spatially separated
individual antenna elements, out of which one or more is selected by the transceiver
[74]. Hence this chapter will not consider this form of diversity as well.
3.1.1 Pattern Diversity
Reconfigurable antennas that exhibit pattern diversity can generate different radia-
tion patterns [75]. The quintessential example for a pattern diversity antenna is a
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beamforming antenna that can direct its main lobe in different directions, with each
possible direction representing a mode of the antenna. The rays departing and arriv-
ing in different directions are weighted differently by the different modes, resulting in
different channels. The decorrelation between channels corresponding to two antenna
modes is dictated by the environment as well as the pattern correlation coefficient
between the two patterns.
3.1.2 Polarization Diversity
An antenna’s polarization is defined as the polarization of the generated electric
or magnetic field [76]. Reconfigurable antennas that exhibit polarization diversity
can induce electric or magnetic fields whose sense of polarizations can be changed
dynamically. A simple example for such an antenna would be a pair of crossed
dipoles with a selection switch to select one of them at a time. This arrangement can
provide a choice between choosing horizontal or vertical polarizations. In general a
polarization reconfigurable antenna can be designed to switch between different linear
polarizations (a maximum of three corresponding to the electric field and three for
the magnetic field), two circular polarizations (clockwise or counterclockwise) and
any number of elliptical polarizations (with different axial ratios and tilt angles) [77].
In addition to their capability to generate different channels, pattern and polar-
ization reconfigurable antennas also present the antenna engineer with the ability to
induce the different modes from within the same physical structure which is a critical
design factor in increasingly space constrained wireless devices.
Different techniques that have been developed to realize pattern and polarization
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reconfigurable antennas are reviewed next. Portions of the following sections are
based on material found in [13].
3.2 Techniques for Pattern Reconfigurable Antennas
The radiation pattern of an antenna is determined by the spatial distribution of the
surface currents on the antenna structure. With judicious design, it is possible to
induce different current distributions in the antenna while preserving a good match
at the frequency of interest. Pattern reconfiguration has been achieved through me-
chanical and structural changes, electrical changes and material changes.
3.2.1 Mechanical and Structural Changes
Directional antennas equipped with stepper motors that can be rotated to point
the main lobe in different directions are simple examples of pattern reconfiguration
achieved through mechanical changes. A reflector antenna with a mechanically mov-
able mesh reflector to achieve pattern reconfigurations is reported in [78]. The physical
shape of a sub-reflector made of flexible conductive material is dynamically changed
using piezoelectric actuators to change the radiation pattern in [79].
Microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) switches have been used in several de-
signs to achieve pattern reconfiguration. Cantilever structures fabricated within a
trough waveguide are actuated electrostatically or magnetostatically to create pertur-
bations that change the propagation constant in the waveguide to produce scanned
beams in [80]. A planar ”V” antenna whose arms can be moved laterally using MEMS
actuators is reported in [81].
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3.2.2 Electrical Changes
Pattern reconfiguration through electrical changes are commonly effected through
solid state or MEMS switches. The parasitic dipole array, first proposed in [82],
uses a driven dipole element surrounded by parasitic dipoles loaded with tunable
reactances as shown in Fig. 3.2. Directive beams in different directions are obtained
by tuning the reactances through varactors. A number of reconfigurable antenna
architectures based on this idea have been reported in literature [83–89]. Microstrip
based versions of this antenna concept are described in [90–92]. A two dimensional
beam steerer based on a similar concept is presented in [93] where a phase gradient is
created between small resonant elements laid out in a lattice arrangement by changing
the capacitances between them using varactors.
Figure 3.2: Schematic of a seven-element circular array of reactively loaded
parasitic dipoles for reconfigurable beam steering and beam forming [82].
Another approach for pattern reconfiguration is to change the effective geometry
of the antenna structure. The reconfigurable square microstrip spiral developed in
[94] provides two beams: a broadside radiation pattern in its fundamental mode
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when the switches are turned off and a beam tilted at 45 w.r.t the broadside when
the switches are activated. Similar structures are reported in [95–98]. In [99] the
length of the dipole arms are changed by toggling a PIN diode switch as shown in
Fig. 3.3a. The arm lengths are designed such that acceptable levels of matching is
maintained at the frequency of interest at both states. The minor changes in current
distributions provide a small degree of pattern diversity at this frequency. Due to
the array arrangement that was considered in the study, mutual coupling from the
adjacent element was exploited to contribute to pattern diversity as well.
The differences in current distributions between different modes in microstrip
antennas and the resulting radiation patterns provide a mechanism for pattern recon-
figuration. The reconfigurable antenna reported in [22, 23] toggles between TM13 and
TM14 modes by changing the radius of a circular patch. This antenna shown in Fig.
3.3b, contains an inner patch that is designed to resonate at the TM13 mode. When
the PIN diodes on the periphery of the patch are turned on, they connect the inner
patch to the outer ring to form a larger circular patch that is designed to resonate at
the TM14 mode.
The composite right left handed (CRLH) metamaterial transmission line concept
has been used to realize a compact planar beam steering antenna from end fire to end
fire directions in [100]. The direction of the main beam in a leaky wave antenna is
determined by the phase constant of the leaky transmission line. In the metamaterial
inspired leaky wave antenna, varactor diodes are employed to change the constituent
unit cell parameters and hence the metamaterial transmission line’s phase constant.
By changing the bias voltage across the varactors, the phase constant of the trans-
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Figure 3.3: (a) Schematic of the reconfigurable printed dipole antenna presented
in [99] (b) Schematic of the reconfigurable circular patch antenna presented in [22,
23]
mission line is changes which in turn changes the direction of the antenna’s main
beam.
3.2.3 Material Changes
Changes to material characteristics can result in changes in the antenna’s current
distributions which in turn can be utilized to change its radiation patterns. In non
resonant antennas, it can used to change the propagation speeds of the traveling
waves to result in beam steering capabilities.
A two-dimensional grid array of resonant slot antennas built on a conventional
substrate is converted into a beam steerable antenna by using a variable permittivity
ferroelectric superstrate [101]. Bias applied between the conducting plate and the
ground plane that sandwiches the ferroelectric material tunes it to exhibit different
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permittivity values, the result of which is to steer the beam in different directions.
Other antenna designs inspired by this technique have been studied in [102–104].
Leaky wave antennas that rely on material changes to steer the beam have also been
developed [105].
3.3 Techniques for Polarization Reconfigurable Antennas
Polarization of an antenna is determined by the direction of current flow in the an-
tenna and therefore reconfiguring polarization in general requires changing this di-
rection in the antenna structure. This has been achieved by changing the antenna
structure, material properties or feed configuration.
Literature is abound with patch and ring antenna designs that employ solid state
or MEMS switches to electrically modify the structure in order to achieve reconfigura-
bility in polarization. Many variants of patch antennas with switchable orthogonal
slots have been reported in [42,43]. Alternately toggling the switch states yields either
clockwise or counterclockwise circular polarizations. Other designs use switches to
select between different feeds to achieve different polarizations. Two slot ring antenna
designs, shown in Fig. 3.4, capable of switching between linear and circular polariza-
tions or between right-hand or left-hand circular polarizations have been reported in
[106]. Switching between linear and circular polarization is achieved by connecting
and disconnecting two current perturbation elements to the main rings via PIN diode
switches. Similarly switching between the two circular polarizations is accomplished
by alternately connecting and disconnecting two sets of orthogonal current perturba-
tion elements to the main rings. Designs based on similar principles that use MEMS
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switches instead of diodes have been recently explored in [107].
Figure 3.4: Two polarization-reconfigurable slot ring antennas presented in
[106]: (a) switchable between linear and left-hand circular polarizations and (b)
switchable between left- and right-hand circular polarizations.
Some researchers have also explored the idea of using material changes for dynamic
polarization reconfiguration. For example, in [108], a range of elliptical polarizations
were induced in a microstrip antenna by applying a static bias field to a ferrite
substrate. Different bias voltages change the frequency of the cross-polarized fields
which results in different co-polar to cross-polar field ratios at the frequency of interest
leading to different degrees of elliptical polarizations.
3.4 Compound Reconfigurable Antennas
It is desirable to combine the two different modes of diversity in a single antenna
as it provides the system designer with more degrees of freedom to work with in
order achieve the desired system performance. Antennas that can be reconfigured
in different diversity modes are termed as compound reconfigurable antennas. Some
conceptual designs for such have been reported in literature in recent times. Pixel-
based approaches have dominated this concept landscape. In pixel antennas, the
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antenna aperture is divided into small, individually controllable segments. In theory,
arbitrary current and field distributions can be achieved by carefully activating a
subset of these segments. A antenna based on this principle is conceptualized in [109]
where a subset of a planar lattice of subwavelength conductive pads, connected via
solid state or MEMS switches, is selected via genetic algorithms to form the required
mode of operation. The exorbitantly high number of switches and the required biasing
networks, pose a major challenge to realizing such antenna structures. Semiconductor
plasmas instead of switches have been explored in [110].
Figure 3.5: Schematic of the polarization and pattern reconfigurable circular
patch antenna presented in [22, 24].
But more practically viable compound reconfigurable antennas do exist. The pat-
tern and polarization reconfigurable antenna shown in Fig. 3.5, uses PIN diodes to
vary the radius of the circular patch to induce the TM21 and TM31 modes which
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results in two different radiation patterns [22, 24]. Additionally, activating and deac-
tivating the perturbation segments via PIN diodes induces circular and linear polar-
izations respectively. This antenna also has two ports which maintains orthogonality
between the patterns for use in multi-antenna systems such as MIMO systems.
3.5 Summary
The different diversity branches of pattern and polarization reconfigurable antennas
provide different decorrelated channels that can lead to increases in system through-
put or improvements in link reliability. The general principle behind pattern recon-
figuration is to include mechanisms that change the current pattern on the antenna
structure. Polarization diversity is based on the principle of changing the directions
of the current distributions on the antenna. The required changes in current dis-
tributions are induced through a variety of mechanisms including electrical changes,
change of feed points, and material changes.
In the following section, a pattern reconfigurable antenna design will be presented
and its benefits in terms of improving throughput in a MIMO system will be demon-
strated. Despite their capabilities, the complexity and cost of reconfigurable antennas
have been a major hurdle for their large scale adoption in commercial systems. Sub-
sequent chapters will demonstrate how reconfigurable antennas can be utilized for
security applications that will significantly add value to them in a wireless system.
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Chapter 4: Design of Reconfigurable Antenna Array for
Pattern Diversity in MIMO Communication Systems
4.1 Introduction
A pattern reconfigurable antenna array design is presented in this chapter [21]. The
antenna design consists of a spiral antenna whose arm length is varied using a PIN
diode switch to induce pattern diversity. To elicit its benefits, the performance en-
hancement in terms of capacity improvements achievable in a 2 × 2 MIMO system
equipped with these wideband antennas is demonstrated through simulations and
measurements.
The primary goal of this chapter is to demonstrate a method in which reconfig-
urable antennas can be designed for use in the security applications to be discussed
in the proceeding chapters. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 1, the benefit in terms
of capacity improvements, coupled with the security features, enhances the value of a
reconfigurable antenna in a wireless system. Therefore this chapter also demonstrates
the benefits gained from using pattern reconfiguration in wireless systems in terms of
capacity improvements.
4.2 Reconfigurable Single Arm Archimedean Spiral Antenna
Array
The Archimedian spiral antenna is a well known and extensively studied design [111–
114]. The main features of spiral antennas include their wide bandwidth, wide half
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power beam width (HPBW), and circularly polarized radiation patterns. Planar
versions of these antennas are widely used in applications ranging from WLANs,
GSM, CDMA and RFIDs due to their low profile, light weight, and high efficiency in
addition to the previously mentioned characteristics [115–117].
4.2.1 Theory of Operation
The radius r at a point on the arm of an Archimedean spiral is related to the total
angle subscribed by the arm at that point φ by:
r = kφ+ r1 (4.1)
where k is the spiral constant that controls the spacing between the arms and r1 is
the starting radius [118].
The theoretical lowest frequency fL of the spiral is determined by its outer radius
ro and is given by:
fL =
c
2piro
(4.2)
where c denotes the speed of light. Similarly the highest frequency fH is given by:
fH =
c
2pir1
(4.3)
However reflections at the ends will result in a slight increase in fL which can be be
minimized by using resistive loading at the end of the arm. Due to feed effects, fH
will also be lower than the theoretically predicted value.
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For a given frequency, this antenna starts radiating from a region where the cir-
cumference of the spiral is equal to one wavelength. This region is termed as the
first active region. As the spiral grows, more active regions are encountered when
the circumference becomes a multiple of the wavelength. These regions are termed
as second active region, third active region and so on. Radiations corresponding to
the different active regions supported by the antenna are superimposed and result in
a net radiation pattern. Due to the phase differences of the currents at the differ-
ent active regions and due to the coupling effects from adjacent arms, the patterns
exhibit different shifts in the direction of maximum radiation w.r.t. the radiation
pattern corresponding to the first active region [118]. The reconfigurable spiral an-
tenna exploits this phenomenon to induce pattern reconfiguration. A large number
of different antenna patterns can be induced using this principle by designing the
antenna to support several active regions.
4.2.2 Antenna Design
Figure 4.1 shows the fabricated antenna structure. Figure 4.2 shows the schematic of
the designed antenna in a two element array arrangement separated by a distance of
λ/4 and the associated dimensions. The design frequency is 8.2 GHz. The antenna
was built on a FR4 substrate backed by a ground plane to improve its directivity.
With judicious orientation of the antenna (for e.g., placing them parallel to the ground
with the ground plane facing the ground), this increase in directivity will significantly
improve the coverage area of the antenna.
PIN diode switches are placed at the point on the arm when the circumference
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Figure 4.1: Reconfigurable spiral antenna for pattern diversity.
of the antenna is approximately one and a half wavelength. The total run length of
the antenna is determined such that the outer circumference is approximately two
wavelengths long. This results in the antenna to operate in the first active region
(short mode) when the diode switch is turned off. Turning on the diode switch also
excites the second active region (long mode) resulting in a tilted beam relative to the
previous one. The exact dimensions required to induce the different active regions
and achieve a 50Ω match at the operating frequency were obtained through the finite
element based electromagnetic simulation software HFSS [119].
When laid out in a two element array arrangement, a total of four configurations
can be defined: “long-long”, “short-short”, “short-long” and “long-short”. The mea-
sured S11 values are shown in Fig. 4.3 for the first antenna element in all the four
combinations. The antenna can be observed to exhibit a bandwidth of approximately
2.5% of the center frequency. The different levels of mutual coupling from the adja-
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Capacitor (Blocks DC from entering the RF source)
Inductor (Blocks AC from entering the RF source)
DC Feed
Connection to DC GND
Coaxial Feed
Figure 4.2: Structure of antenna array. Bottom side is completely backed by
a metallic ground plane. Substrate length and width = 30mm, substrate thick-
ness = 1.27mm, spiral constant = 0.7 mm/rad, arm width = 1mm, short mode
circumference = 1.45λ, long mode circumference = 2.19λ, antenna separation =
λ/4 (9.5mm)
cent element, results in slight shifts in the resonant frequencies for each configuration.
However, the wide bandwidth ensures sufficient low return losses in all cases at the
frequency of interest.
The simulated radiation patterns for both the antenna elements in all four config-
urations are shown in Fig. 4.4. The main beam of each array element shows a shift
of of 5o − 30o between the different configurations. Note that the beam tilt is due to
both the change in active regions as well as mutual coupling with the other antenna.
The patterns were also observed to be left hand circularly polarized. The degree of
antenna polarization was not investigated since the main objective was to focus on
the benefits of pattern diversity.
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Figure 4.3: Measured S11 for the reconfigurable spiral antenna array. S11 cor-
responds to the first antenna in the array.
Figure 4.4: Simulated radiation patterns in the azimuthal plane for the two
spiral elements in the array for all possible configurations.
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4.2.3 System Model and Performance Metrics
For the purposes of analyzing this antenna, a flat fading MIMO communication chan-
nel is assumed, which is described by the following equation [74]:
y = Hx + n (4.4)
where x is the NT x 1 transmitted signal vector, y is the NR x 1 received signal
vector and H is the NR x NT channel transfer matrix. NR and NT are the number of
receivers and transmitters respectively. n denotes the additive white Gaussian noise.
For a single carrier, the capacity of this system is given by [74]:
C = log2
[
det
(
INR +
SNR
NT
HH†
)]
(4.5)
where INR is the NR x NR identity matrix and SNR the signal to noise ratio. †
denotes the complex conjugate transpose. The capacity computed using simulated
and measured channels is used as the metric to evaluate the performance of the
designed antenna array. A Frobenius normalization of the channel matrix is performed
using the ”short-short” channel matrix to eliminate path loss differences between all
the different links and to keep the relative antenna gains for different configurations
intact [120].
4.2.4 Electromagnetic Simulations and Measurement Setup
A 2 × 2 MIMO system employing the reconfigurable antennas at both link ends was
simulated using the electromagnetic ray tracer, FASANT [121]. The atrium on the
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Figure 4.5: CAD drawing illustrating transmitter and receiver locations of the
indoor environment used for simulation and measurements.
3rd floor of the Bossone research building on Drexel University campus was chosen
as the test environment. Figure 4.5 shows the layout of the environment and the
simulated topology. The two antenna arrays can take on four different configurations
at each end and hence a total of sixteen different configurations are possible for the
whole system. Channel matrices H were computed for all sixteen configurations for
each of the six links using a single 8.2GHz tone.
The channel measurements were taken using a two channel vector network ana-
lyzer (VNA). The channel measurement procedure using a VNA is outlined in Ap-
pendix B. The same topology used for the simulations was used for measurements.
The channels were obtained over the frequency range of 8.1 GHz to 8.3 GHz with a
sweep time of 573 µs for each measurement. The channel at 8.2 GHz was used in the
analysis.
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Figure 4.6: CDF of simulated channel capacity for the reconfigurable spiral
array, fixed spiral array and dipoles separated by λ/4 and λ/2.
4.2.5 Capacity Results
Figure 4.6 shows the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) for the channel capacity
at a SNR of 20 dB obtained through simulations. Four different antenna systems
were considered: the reconfigurable spiral antenna array, all spiral antennas at the
transmitter and receiver in short mode and conventional dipole arrays with spacing of
λ/2 and λ/4. The reconfigurable spiral antenna array is defined as the combination
among the 16 different possibilities that has the highest possible capacity at every
time instant.
It can be seen that the reconfigurable spiral array outperforms the other antenna
systems significantly. For an outage probability of 0.5, it has a capacity gain of 1.4
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Figure 4.7: CDF of measured channel capacity for the reconfigurable spiral
array and fixed spiral array.
bps/Hz over a dipole array separated by a distance of λ/2, 2 bps/Hz over a fixed
spiral antenna array and 2.3 bps/Hz over a dipole array separated by λ/4.
The measurement results shown in Fig. 4.7 reflect the simulated trends where
the reconfigurable array achieves a capacity gain of around 2.8 bps/Hz over the non
reconfigurable spiral array for an outage probability of 0.5. Figure 4.8 shows the
measured capacity improvement over a fixed spiral antenna array operating in the
short mode at both ends of the link as a function of SNR for the six measured links.
The reconfigurable array shows significant improvements especially in the lower SNR
regime. A peak average capacity improvement of around 60% is achieved for certain
locations at 0 dB SNR. The average capacity improvement over the 6 links is 54%,
32% and 18% at 0, 10 and 20 dBs respectively. As expected the improvements tend
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Figure 4.8: Measured capacity improvement with a reconfigurable spiral array
over a fixed spiral array operating in the short mode.
to diminish as SNR increases since the receiver can sense a better signal regardless
of the antenna pattern under these conditions. However in real operating conditions
SNR values tend to be on the lower side most of the time, which elicits the utility of
reconfigurable antennas.
4.3 Summary
An Archimedean spiral antenna that was reconfigurable in length using PIN diodes
was studied. The different active regions induced by the different arm lengths generate
antenna patterns that are tilted with respect to each other. The relatively wider
bandwidth of the antenna and its compact size makes it a suitable candidate for use
in compact wideband wireless systems.
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The designed antenna elements were employed in a 2 × 2 MIMO system whose
performance was analyzed in terms of channel capacity. The results confirm the
ability of reconfigurable antennas to yield significant improvements in capacity over
non reconfigurable antennas.
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Chapter 5: A Reconfigurable Antenna Based Fingerprint
Solution for Intrusion Detection in Wireless Networks
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the first of the reconfigurable antenna based authentication schemes is
presented. A threat model is first presented for the class of threats that are addressed
by this scheme. An appropriate channel model for the scenarios relevant to the threat
model is developed. The proposed solution for device authentication is formulated
by first defining an authentication metric best suited to exploit the capabilities of a
reconfigurable antenna and an associated hypothesis test to verify the identity of the
transmitter on a packet-by-packet basis. Field measurements of the channel frequency
response for a reconfigurable antenna were performed to quantify the performance of
the proposed scheme. The effect that the correlation between the different antenna
patterns has on the authentication performance is demonstrated based on these mea-
surements. Furthermore the performance gains that can be achieved by the scheme
is studied as a function of the number of antenna modes. Oﬄine mode analysis is
performed to give a loose upper bound on performance while online mode analysis
results are presented to quantify achievable authentication performance in realtime.
Based on the observed results, general guidelines on how to choose the different ele-
ments of the decision metric in order to realize better performance for channel based
authentication schemes based on any diversity scheme are provided.
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5.2 Problem Description and Threat Model
The problem that is being addressed in this study is one of establishing the identity
of a transmitting device in a wireless network. The proposed authentication scheme
is based on the basic idea that the channel between the legitimate transmitter and
receiver is difficult to replicate by a malicious entity. Different modes in a recon-
figurable antenna present different views of this channel, and thus emulating all the
channels seen by the different modes becomes a more difficult proposition for the
intruder. Therefore associating a device with a unique channel based identifier or
fingerprint could yield a robust authentication mechanism. It should be emphasized
that this identifier utilizes the raw complex channel information rather than any ab-
stracted power based metrics such as RSSI. This allows the scheme to be more robust
to attacks that try to circumvent it through simple power control. Moreover it should
be noted that the objective is not to localize the transmitting device; rather the goal
is to find an unique identifier for each transmitting device in the network based on its
location. A data packet that generates the proper location fingerprint at the receiver
can be then trusted to be arriving from the legitimate user and vice versa.
The problem evolves as shown in Fig. 5.1. It consists of three different players:
a receiver (R), a transmitter (T) and an intruder (I). T and R initiate a connection
at the outset of the session and are in the process of exchanging information (5.1a).
At this stage, R measures and stores the channel between itself and T for N different
antenna modes. Based on these channels, a threshold λ is computed by R. Similarly
channels are estimated for all subsequent transmissions (5.1b). These channels are
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compared with a reference channel (the most recent channel to pass the comparison
test) based on a distance metric D (5.1c). If the distance falls below the threshold
λ the packet is treated as arriving from a T, and vice versa. It is assumed that R
performs this comparison periodically and holds the most recent copy of the channel
information that passes the test in its memory as the reference channel.
To gain a practical perspective of the problem, R can be thought of as a wireless
access point through which T is connected to the organizational network. I can be an
adversarial entity whose objective is to gain entry into the organizational network,
hijack T’s connection with R or launch a man-in-the-middle attack on the connection
between T and R among other possibilities. The objective of the security scheme is to
detect this change in the real transmitter at R in order to initiate counter measures.
To achieve his goal, I can be equipped with a powerful transceiver capable of
passively monitoring and capturing all traffic between T and R and sufficient com-
putational resources to analyze the traffic to exploit the vulnerabilities in relatively
quick time. I can be an external adversary attempting to launch an attack on the
network from outside the organization’s premises or an internal entity who is inter-
ested in launching an attack on T. In both cases, it should be noted that I cannot
be physically co-located with T which forms the basis of the proposed method for
intrusion detection.
It should be also noted that I’s motive is to compromise T’s identity in the network
and therefore it is imperative for I that T first initiates and establishes a connection
with R. Therefore it is assumed that I will not resort to jamming attacks to prevent
T from establishing a successful connection with R.
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Figure 5.1: Different stages (a) - (c) during the evolution of the authentication
problem during a data transfer session between R and T.
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Additionally it is assumed that only R is equipped with a reconfigurable antenna
with N modes since it is more likely that an access point is equipped with such an
antenna than a user terminal due to cost and space constraints. Therefore T and R
are taken to be equipped with standard omni-directional antennas.
5.3 Channel Model
Unlike mobile phone based services, a multitude of current and emerging wireless data
services involve stationary terminals at both ends of the link. The terminal locations
are usually fixed or movements are localized to a very small area near the seated
user for the duration of a session. Temporal variations in such channels, termed as
nomadic mobility channels, mostly arise due to movements of people and objects in
the vicinity of the terminals. A typical example for such a scenario would be an user
seated at a bench in a public place accessing the network from a laptop connected to
an access point in the vicinity. In this study the focus is limited to such channels since
they represent a more common usage scenario for current high data rate applications.
For a fixed link, the directional channel impulse response for an environment with
L clusters and K rays per cluster is given by:
h(φR, φT ) =
1√
LK
L−1∑
l=0
K−1∑
k=0
βklδ(φ
T − φTkl)δ(φT − φRkl) (5.1)
where φT and φR are the transmit and receive angles, βkl is the complex ray gain
of the kth ray in the lth cluster, and φTkl and φ
R
kl are their corresponding angle of
departure and arrival. The narrowband channel impulse response corresponding to
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this cluster model is given by:
h =
∫ pi
−pi
∫ pi
−pi
GR(φ
R)h(φR, φT )GT (φ
T )dφTdφR (5.2)
where GR(φ
T ) and GR(φ
T ) are the antenna gain patterns at the transmitter and
reciever. If we assume a omni-directional radiation pattern at the transmitter, sub-
stituting (5.1) in (5.2) simplifies to:
h =
1√
LK
L−1∑
l=0
K−1∑
k=0
βklGR(φ
R
kl) (5.3)
For a sufficiently narrowband channel, we can assume flat fading, and h will be given
by a single complex number with |h| distributed according to a Rayleigh or Ricean
distribution. (5.3) quantifies the dependence of h on the antenna configuration at
the receiver. For the kth receiver antenna configuration, the corresponding channel is
denoted by hk.
Previous measurement campaigns on nomadic mobility channels have shown that
for stationary terminals, the temporal channel variations are imparted primarily due
to shadowing and scattering by the moving scatterers in the vicinity of the link [122–
124]. Figure 5.2 shows the temporal variation in the measured frequency response
corresponding to a single link for a single antenna mode (Section 5.5). The entire
shaded region constitutes the total power variation in the channel over a period of
approximately 6 hours during regular working hours when there was considerable
human movement between the two ends of the link. The results follow similar trends
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that have been reported in earlier measurements where most of the variations are
confined to a narrow regions [122]. Consistent with the models proposed in the
earlier works, therefore the channel is modeled as follows:
hˆk = Xhk + + n (5.4)
where X denotes the shadowing imposed on the time invariant component hk,  is
the additional small scale fading component induced by the scatterers and n denotes
receiver noise.  and n can be modeled as a complex Gaussian process with 0 means
and variances σ2 and σ
2
N respectively. X is modeled as a random variable with a
log-normal distribution with 0 mean and variance σ2S.
Figure 5.2: Temporal variation in channel frequency response for a single link
with a single antenna configuration over a period of 6 hours.
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5.4 Identification Metric and Identity Test
In order to perform the channel comparison, R would require an authentication metric
based on the channel information. The metric corresponding to the two channel
realizations can be then used to make a decision about the transmitter’s identity.
First the decision vector is defined as:
hˆ = [|hˆ1| |hˆ2| . . . |hˆN |]T (5.5)
where hˆ is a vector that consists of channel amplitudes corresponding to different
receiver antenna modes. The vector hˆ can be considered as the spatial signature or
fingerprint associated with a terminal at a particular location. The angle between
two spatial signatures hˆi and hˆl in the N dimensional space is now proposed as the
test statistic to test if the signatures correspond to the same terminals
θ = cos−1
(
hˆi · hˆl
|hˆi||hˆl|
)
(5.6)
where i and l denote the packet indices whose corresponding channel vectors are
compared. Other candidates for a test statistic include Euclidean distance between
the channels [7, 9, 11, 72] and difference in total channel power. However the angle
based statistic has two properties that makes it attractive for a reconfigurable antenna
based authentication scheme. Depending on the environmental conditions, channels
from certain modes may be stronger than the others. Such stronger channels tend to
dominate the value of the computed test statistic in distance or power based metrics,
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rendering the information contained in the weaker channels useless. However the angle
based test statistic weights channels from all the modes equally, resulting in better
utilization of all the available information. Second, the support of the test statistic
is naturally limited (0o ≤ θ ≤ 360o) and hence smoother distribution functions can
be formed with limited number of training samples. This same property will also be
desirable when oﬄine learning techniques based on standard wireless channel models
are employed to train the system in the future.
Since the test statistic is the angle between the two spatial signatures, the vectors
can be normalized without altering its value. Therefore θ can now be written as:
θ = cos−1
(
h¯i · h¯l
)
(5.7)
= cos−1
(
N∑
n=1
|h¯ni||h¯nl|
)
(5.8)
where h¯i =
hˆi
|hˆi| and h¯ni denotes the elements of the normalized vector. The bar
denotes the modified quantity after normalization in the proceeding discussion.
The duration of shadowing is long compared to the packet transmission times and
considered to be constant for all antenna configurations at any channel estimation
period. Therefore at time instant i, the channel corresponding to a terminal is given
by:
h¯i =

|X¯ih¯i1 + ¯i1 + n¯i1|
|X¯ih¯i2 + ¯i2 + n¯i2|
...
|X¯i ¯hiN + ¯iN + ¯niN |

(5.9)
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From (5.9) and (5.8), the angle between this vector and another spatial signature
at time instant l is given by:
θ = cos−1
(
N∑
n=1
|X¯ih¯in + ¯in + n¯in||X¯lh¯ln + ¯ln + n¯ln|
)
(5.10)
X¯ih¯in + ¯in + n¯in involves the sum of a lognormal random variable and a normal
random variable for which a tractable closed form pdf expression does not exist.
Therefore empirical density functions for θ obtained from measurements will be used
for analysis.
However previous studies have shown that that the variable component  is usually
between 20 to 50 dB lower than the static component for majority of the time [122].
Therefore for a simpler case where |+ n| << |Xh|, hˆn can be written as:
hˆn u Xhn (5.11)
and
hi = Xi
[
|hi1| |hi2| . . . |hiN |
]
(5.12)
Normalizing hi removes the effect of Xi and can be written as:
h¯i =
[
|h¯i1| ¯|hi2| . . . ¯|hiN |
]
(5.13)
and
θ = cos−1
(
N∑
n=1
|h¯in||h¯ln|
)
(5.14)
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which is the ‘true’ angle between the two channels corresponding to the two locations
from which packets i and l originated.
Given the authentication metric θ, the problem of classifying the transmitter now
becomes a hypothesis testing problem. The null hypothesis H0 is defined as the
case where the incoming packet is from the same legitimate transmitter T and the
alternate hypothesis H1 to be otherwise. Denoting the transmitter corresponding to
hi as T (hi), the test can be written as:
H0 : T (hi) = T (hl) (5.15)
H1 : T (hi) 6= T (hl) (5.16)
The conditional probability distributions of the authentication metric θ and the cor-
responding cumulative distribution functions will be denoted as follows:
H0 : pθ(d|H0), φ0(θ) (5.17)
H1 : pθ(d|H1), φ1(θ) (5.18)
For a given false alarm rate α a threshold λ can be found such that
α = pθ(θ > λ|H0) (5.19)
= 1− φ0(λ) (5.20)
⇒ λ = φ−10 (1− α) (5.21)
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The probability of missed detection β can be defined for this threshold as:
β = p(θ < λ|H1) = φ1(φ−10 (1− α)) (5.22)
For a given authentication metric θ we can now form estimates for α and β.
5.5 Measurement Setup and Reconfigurable Antenna
Channel measurements to evaluate the performance of the reconfigurable antenna
based user identification scheme were performed using a four port vector network
analyzer (VNA) (Agilent N5230A) by measuring S21 between the transmitter and
receivers. Details of the channel measurement procedure using a VNA are given in
Appendix B. The location chosen for the measurements was a medium sized labora-
tory on Drexel University campus. The laboratory is 20m long, 8 m wide, and 4 m
high. The lab has a back room separated from the main lab by a plaster wall and sev-
eral cubicles segmented by metallic walls and has other typical laboratory furniture,
electronic equipment, and cabling scattered throughout the room. The measurement
layout and setup is shown in Fig. 5.3. T and I locations were chosen so that there
were a combination of both LOS and NLOS links. R was equipped with a recon-
figurable metamaterial leaky wave antenna (LWA) which is described in C. T and I
were equipped with omni-directional whip antennas. The antenna at the receiver was
mounted at a height of 2.5 m while the antennas at the transmitters were mounted
at the desk level of approximately 0.75m.
The frequency was swept over a 22 MHz bandwidth centered at 2.484GHz which
61
Figure 5.3: 2D CAD model of test environment. Test locations of R, T and I
are indicated. The reconfigurable antenna’s beams were approximately oriented
at R as shown in the diagram.
corresponds to channel 14 of the IEEE 802.11n standard. 64 evenly spaced frequency
samples were measured over this bandwidth. Two locations for R and four locations
for T were chosen yielding a total of eight links. For each of these links, ten different
I locations were considered. For each (R,T,I) pair, channels corresponding to the T-R
and I-R links were measured for 5 different antenna configurations at R every 10 sec-
onds for a total of 1000 samples. The time to complete each sweep was automatically
set by the VNA to 130 msec. Due to speed limitations in the control board for chang-
ing antenna modes, a 0.25 sec delay was introduced while switching between different
antenna modes. Measurements were taken over several days during both morning
and evening hours when the human traffic was moderate and low respectively.
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The patterns in the elevation plane for the five antenna modes used in this study
are shown in Fig. 5.4. All modes were vertically polarized with nearly equal gains
of approximately 0.5dB. The choice of this antenna is justified by its ability to
electrically steer the antenna beam while having a significantly compact form factor.
Figure 5.4: Radiation patterns of the LWA in the elevation plane (corresponds
to the plane of the 2D model defined in Fig. 5.3) for the 5 different configurations
used in our measurements. Patterns are vertically polarized for all modes.
5.6 Channel Correlation
The N elements of the decision vector hˆ correspond to channels estimates for the dif-
ferent antenna modes used in the reconfigurable antenna (i.e. this scheme is based on
exploiting pattern diversity). However one could devise a similar scheme by utilizing
channel coefficients corresponding to N different frequencies (frequency diversity), or
spatial snapshots (spatial diversity). In this section the amount of correlation that
exists between the elements in hˆ for different diversity schemes will be empirically
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quantified.
The pattern correlation coefficient between radiation patterns corresponding to
antenna modes i and j is defined as:
ρi,j =
∫
4pi
Ej(Ω)E
†
i (Ω)dΩ√∫
4pi
|Ei(Ω)|2dΩ
∫
4pi
|Ej(Ω)|2dΩ
(5.23)
where Ei(Ω) is the radiation pattern for the i
th mode and † denotes complex conju-
gation. The correlation coefficients generated by this definition for the five azimuthal
patterns used in our study are listed in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Pattern correlation coefficients between different modes of the LWA
Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3 Mode 4 Mode 5
Mode 1 1 0.73 0.42 0.10 0.06
Mode 2 0.73 1 0.82 0.27 0.07
Mode 3 0.42 0.82 1 0.55 0.11
Mode 4 0.10 0.27 0.55 1 0.56
Mode 5 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.56 1
Channel correlation coefficients with respect to the first antenna mode, averaged
over the eight T-R links are shown in Fig. 5.5. The correlation between channels
corresponding to two modes is given by:
%i,j =
E
[(|hi| − µ|hi|) (|hj| − µ|hj |)]
σ|hi|σ|hj |
(5.24)
where |hi| denotes channels corresponding to mode i. µ|hi| is the mean of |hi| and
σ|hi| is the standard deviation of |hi|. E[·] denotes the expectation operator.
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The first row of Table 5.1 is superimposed on the figure to illustrate the influence
of pattern correlation on the resulting channel correlations. Figure 5.5 reflects the
conventional wisdom that uncorrelated patterns lead to uncorrelated channels in rich
multipath environments. The channel correlation coefficients with respect to the first
measured frequency for all other frequencies are also shown in the figure. This result
agrees with well known published results as well [125]. However, of interest to us is the
comparison between the correlations arising from pattern and frequency correlations.
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Figure 5.5: Pattern and channel correlation coefficients. The upper X axis
corresponds to indices of antenna modes and lower X corresponds to indices of
different frequencies. Correlations are defined w.r.t. to mode 1 and the first
measured frequency respectively.
In our measured environment, approximately a 5MHz frequency separation was
required to achieve a correlation factor of 0.2 and 11MHz separation for 0.1. However
relying on frequency separation for channel decorrelation presents two problems. The
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first problem is that it is not straightforward to estimate the frequency separation
required for a given level of decorrelation without proper knowledge of the RMS delay
spread of the environment. Second, most wireless systems are band limited and our
ability to span the frequency axis to achieve a required level of decorrelation may not
be possible for many applications. On the other hand using pattern diversity for ap-
plications requiring decorrelated channel realizations is a more ‘controlled’ approach
where antenna modes can be designed to exhibit a certain level of decorrelation which
will translate to a similar level of decorrelation in the realized channels. For exam-
ple with just two modes (mode 1 and 5) correlation levels of less than 0.05 can be
achieved. These correlation trends will serve to gain insights on some of the results
to be discussed in the next section.
5.7 Numerical Results
The measurements gathered as described in Section 5.5 were analyzed to quantify the
performance of the reconfigurable antennas based authentication scheme.
For a given N , α and β were obtained as follows:
1. Pick a (R, T, I) combination and a frequency.
2. Pick N antenna modes. for e.g.,
(
N
3
)
= 10 possible selections exist for N = 3. hˆ’s
used in the following steps are formed by stacking the channels corresponding
to the modes present in this combination.
3. Compute pθ(θ|H0) by gathering θ’s corresponding to T - R’s hˆ at time instants
i and i+ 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ 999).
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4. For different α values, determine the corresponding λ’s from this distribution.
5. Compute pθ(θ|H1) by gathering θ’s corresponding to T - R’s hˆ at time instant
i− 1 and I - R’s hˆ at time instant i (2 ≤ i ≤ 1000).
6. From the different λ’s computed in step (3), determine the corresponding values
for miss rate β.
7. Repeat steps (3-6) for all possible mode combinations.
8. Repeat steps (2 - 7) for all possible (R, T, I) combinations.
9. β is averaged over all the possible combinations repeated in steps (7) and (8).
Similarly for frequency diversity, an antenna mode instead of a frequency is picked in
step (1) and N adjacent frequencies are chosen instead of antenna modes in step (2).
Figure 5.6 shows the ROCs obtained for three different mode pairs (out of ten
possible pairs) when two modes are used for authentication. The worst performing
mode corresponds to the mode pair of (2,3). This pair can be seen to have the
highest pattern correlation from Table 5.1. The best performing mode corresponds
to the mode pair (1,4) which is near the lowest correlation level observed among
the radiation patterns. Similar trends can be observed when frequency diversity
is employed as well. However large frequency separations (more decorrelation) are
required between the frequency points used to obtain good performance.
The reason for the detection rate dependence on the correlation between the el-
ements in hˆ can be explained: let us assume two modes or frequencies are highly
correlated. Due to environmental conditions or by deliberate manipulation (such as
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Figure 5.6: Observed β as a function of α for pattern and frequency diversity
for N = 2. (The remaining 7 pairs for pattern diversity follow similar trends and
were omitted to avoid clutter.)
transmit power control, trying out different locations etc.), the intruder’s channel
corresponding to one mode may fall close to that of the legitimate transmitter. Now
the probability of the other mode to fall close to that of the transmitter is also in-
creased due to the high correlation and thus the addition of the new mode does not
increase the quality of the spatial signature contained in hˆ. However if the modes
are decorrelated, the ability for another user to accidentally or intentionally match
all the channels of another user becomes probabilistically more difficult. Thus more
decorrelated elements in the decision vector hˆ lead to improvement in detection rates.
It is therefore clear that higher levels of pattern correlation impede performance and
hence the different antenna modes used in the scheme should have low decorrelation
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between them.
Figure 5.7 shows the performance of the pattern diversity based scheme in de-
tecting intruders for different values of N . For an α of 1% β decreases from 30%
to 3% when N is increased from 2 to 5. For a given α, β decreases with N . As N
grows higher, the probability for the intruder channel to closely match all the channel
elements in hˆ such that θ falls below threshold λ becomes low and hence detection
rate improves.
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Figure 5.7: Observed β as a function of α for reconfigurable antenna based
authentication at different values of N .
Figure 5.8 shows the performance when a different metric is used to compare the
two packets. The new metric is based on the sum of absolute difference in power for
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the different configurations present in the fingerprint and is given by:
θ =
N∑
n=1
||hˆin|2 − |hˆln|2| (5.25)
The results show similar trends as that of the angle based metric. However, it can
be observed the rate higher N ’s the returns diminish at a quicker rate. However the
main drawback of this metric is that its span is not constrained to a fixed support
which makes it difficult to form a smooth distribution for θ. Moreover stronger modes
tend to dominate the decision metric thus rendering weaker modes less useful.
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Figure 5.8: Observed β as a function of α for reconfigurable antenna based
authentication at different values of N for a power based authentication metric
given by (5.24).
It can be observed that the improvement in performance starts to reduce as N is
increased. For example for an α of 1%, β improves by 15% when N goes from 2 to
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3. This improvement reduces to 2% when N increases from 4 to 5. Introducing an
additional mode into hˆ does not necessarily keep the average inter-element correlation
at the same level before its introduction due to the different levels of correlation that
exists between different modes. Due to the limited number of modes used in our
study, this is especially true for higher N (≥4) since hˆ consists of highly correlated
modes and their contribution to the detection rate is only minimal. Hence diminishing
returns in performance improvement is observed as the number of modes increases.
To demonstrate this effect, this study resorts to frequency diversity where the multiple
elements in hˆ are picked to have low correlation between each other and the average
correlation does not change when a new element is introduced. Frequencies that are
separated by 5MHz (resulting channel correlation < 0.2 from Fig. 5.5) for different
values of N are picked. Figure 5.9 shows the resulting ROCs which indicates that
as long as the average correlation among the elements is not diminished, introducing
new modes or frequencies in hˆ will maintain the rate of improvement in detection
rates.
Finally the performance of this scheme when operating in an online mode was
analyzed. The number of samples from T used for initially estimating pθ(θ|H0) is
denoted by NT . θ corresponding to all the NT (NT−1)/2 samples are used for forming
this distribution from which λ was computed for different α. The most recent channel
estimate to pass the authentication process was held in memory for the next test.
Figure 5.10 shows the realized α during this online operation for two different values
of NT . It can be observed that more training leads to good performance. ROCs with
respect to the achieved α is shown in Fig. 5.11. The observed trends are comparable
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Figure 5.9: Observed β as a function of α when the average correlation between
different elements in hˆ remains the same with increasing N . Elements correspond
to frequency points spaced at 5MHz.
to that of the loose upper bound for performance obtained from the oﬄine mode of
analysis shown in Fig. 5.7.
5.8 Practical Considerations
There are several practical issues that need to be addressed in order to implement
this reconfigurable antenna layer based authentication system. Some of the issues
and proposed solutions will be briefly pointed out.
Channel Estimation
A key issue is on how the channel estimates can be obtained for all the different
modes without degrading throughput and power consumption. Figure 5.12 shows a
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Figure 5.10: Realized false alarm rates as a function of designed false alarm
rates during online mode of operation.
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Figure 5.11: Observed β as a function of realized α during online operation.
Solid lines correspond to 10 training packets and dashed lines to 25 training
packets.
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possible structure of a transmit frame for use with this security scheme. The antennas
can cycle through the modes during the transmission of an extended packet during
which the channel estimation is also performed for the different modes. Padding is
inserted between the payload and next training sequence to leave sufficient time for
the antenna to change modes. Switches with speeds on the order of picoseconds do
currently exist and can lead to shorter pad lengths required while switching between
modes.
SYNC 1 
P 
A 
D 
PAYLOAD 2 PAYLOAD N PAYLOAD - - - - -  
P 
A 
D 
P 
A 
D 
Training Symbols for Different Antenna Modes 
Delay for Switching Antenna Mode 
Figure 5.12: Modified transmit frame that can be used to obtain channel esti-
mates corresponding to different antenna modes during a single transmission.
Missed Detections/False Alarms
As in the case of any intruder detection systems, certain conditions may trigger too
many false alarms such as significant changes in environmental conditions near the
transmitter or receiver in our scheme. Upper layer based protocols can be designed
to handle such situations. Similarly due to finite missed detection rates, intruder
packets may go undetected. As noted previously, the purpose of this scheme is to
add an additional layer of security to the system. Hence higher layer security mea-
sures should continue to play their part and should secure the system from such
undetected malicious packets. Moreover the scheme is designed to thwart spoofing
74
and man-in-the-middle attacks. Therefore it is assumed that the intruder will not
commence transmission until the connection has been established between the legiti-
mate transmitting ends during which initial training is performed and the scheme is
initialized.
5.9 Conclusion
A novel reconfigurable antenna based physical layer authentication scheme was pre-
sented and analyzed. By taking channel measurements on a VNA it was shown
that the ability to combine channel information from different antenna configurations
can result in improved intruder detection. The relationship between the correlation
among the elements in the decision metric and the authentication performance was
analyzed. The results showed that the achieved performance improves as the average
decorrelation that exists between the different antenna modes decreases. It was shown
that by choosing modes that are highly decorrelated, high performance levels can be
obtained even when operating in a system with very limited bandwidth. It was also
seen that the performance of the scheme improves with more training in terms of
detection rates and realized false alarm rates approach designed false alarms rates.
Therefore next generation wireless systems that will be equipped with reconfigurable
antennas can benefit from this scheme by employing them to add an additional layer
of security at the physical layer.
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Chapter 6: A Reconfigurable Antenna and GLRT Based
Solution for Intrusion Detection in Wireless Networks
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the capabilities of reconfigurable antennas are utilized to devise a in-
truder detection scheme that operates at the physical layer. The detection problem is
posed as a generalized likelihood ratio (GLR) test problem that operates on the chan-
nel realizations corresponding to different modes present in a reconfigurable antenna.
This scheme relies on detecting intrusion by observing the statistics of the channel
rather than the distances between channel based fingerprints corresponding to a le-
gitimate user and intruder. The performance of the scheme is quantified through field
measurements taken using a vector network analyzer (VNA) in an indoor environment
at the 802.11 frequency band. Based on the measured data, the effect of the different
control parameters on the performance of the intrusion detection scheme is studied.
The performance improvements that can be achieved by combining the channel infor-
mation from multiple modes of a reconfigurable antenna is demonstrated. The effect
of pattern correlation between the different modes on the scheme’s performance is
also analyzed, based on which general guidelines on how to design the different an-
tenna modes are provided. The results show that the proposed scheme can add an
additional layer of security that can significantly alleviate many vulnerabilities and
threats in current fixed wireless networks.
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6.2 Background
Intrusion detection techniques have traditionally been categorized into misuse detec-
tion or anomaly detection techniques. While the former uses patterns characteristic
of known attacks to detect known intrusions, the latter relies on detecting deviations
from the established behavior patterns in the system [126]. In many usage scenar-
ios, where the physical link remains unchanged over a session, the wireless channel
response corresponding to the link can be considered to represent the established be-
havior pattern for that link. Any changes that violate this pattern abruptly beyond a
certain limit can be then checked for adversarial behavior. In this work, this approach
is followed, where the channel is monitored for any abrupt changes in its statistics
through repeated applications of the GLR test [127]. The scheme is based on the idea
that the statistics of the link corresponding to an intruder who is physically located
at a different location will be different from to that of the legitimate user and when
the intruder tries to inject packets over the same connection, it will trigger an abrupt
change in the GLR value. Additionally a pattern reconfigurable antenna is used to
improve the performance of the intrusion detection scheme. Channels correspond-
ing to different modes of the antenna can be expected to have different statistics, a
property which is exploited to the benefit of the proposed detection scheme.
6.3 Problem Definition and Threat Model
The problem that is addressed in this chapter and the corresponding threat model
are the same as that one described in Chapter 5. Transmitter T and receiver R have
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established a connection and are in the process of exchanging information as shown
in Fig. 1.1(a) which is repeated here for ease of reading (Fig. 6.1(a)). Intruder
I eavesdrops into this connection and waits till he gathers sufficient information to
spoof T. Once this information is obtained, I launches a spoofing attack by posing as
T to R as shown in Fig. 6.1(b).
Possible usage scenarios, intruder capabilities and motives are assumed to be
similar to the ones described in Section 5.2. Again it is assumed that only R is
equipped with a reconfigurable antenna with M modes and T and R to be equipped
with omni-directional antennas.PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
T  R 
I  R 
I eavesdrops on T‐R  
connection to obtain 
identifying information 
about T 
T’s Identifying information spoofed 
 
I tries to trick R into believing it is T 
Data  ID_T 
I 
Data  ID_T 
24 | 55
Figure 6.1: Illustration of the problem. (a) T eavesdrops on a data transfer
session between R and T to obtain sensitive information about T’s identity. (b)
After obtaining the information, I tries to masquerade as T to R.
As stated earlier, the proposed solution exploits the fact that T and I have to be
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located in two different physical locations which would be manifested by two different
channel distributions sensed by R. Due to the multipath structure of the environment,
I cannot methodically manipulate the channel between itself and R in such a way as
to imitate the channel between T and R. This is because it does not and cannot know
the channel between T and R. Introducing reconfigurable antennas to the solution
adds multiple channel distributions corresponding to each mode used in the antenna.
This makes the problem of closely matching the channel corresponding to T even more
challenging for I which results in enhanced protection. However it should be noted
that this scheme does not attempt to localize T or I. Instead channel information
pertaining to the different antenna modes is used to detect I if it compromises the
existing link between T and R.
6.4 Description of Scheme
With the notable exception of mobile networks, many current and emerging wire-
less data networks are associated with stationary terminals at both ends of the link.
Temporal variations in channels related to such networks arise mainly due to move-
ments of people and objects in the vicinity of the terminals as well as small localized
movement of the terminals within a very small area [122–124]. A typical example for
such a scenario would be an user seated in a coffee shop accessing the network from
a laptop connected to an access point in the building. This work addresses intrusion
problems that pertain to such wireless network usage scenarios and does not address
large scale terminal mobility.
The amplitude of the estimated complex channel coefficient corresponding to a
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single frequency carrier g, is denoted by h. The probability distribution of h follows
a Ricean or Rayleigh distribution. The latter distribution is chosen with parameter
σ to describe h for reasons that will be discussed in section 6.6:
pσ(h) =
h
σ2
e−h
2/2σ2 (6.1)
During the connection establishment process, σ = σ0 corresponding to T is esti-
mated through a sequence of training packets. At some time instant when I succeeds
in spoofing T, it will hijack this connection. However since I is at a physically differ-
ent location, σ = σ1 corresponding to this link, will be different from σ0 and will be
unknown.
Let hi (i ∈ Z, i > 0) be a sequence of observed i.i.d. channel estimates from the
incoming packets after the initial training stage and h = [hj, . . . , hk]. i can be
taken to denote the packet or time index. N = k − j + 1 is the block size. If we
denote σ(h) as the σ value of the Rayleigh distribution from which the elements of
h originated, the intrusion detection problem can be now formulated as a hypothesis
testing problem as follows:
H0 : σ(h) = σ0 (6.2)
H1 : σ(h) 6= σ0 (6.3)
A Neyman-Pearson detector which decides H1 if the likelihood ratio exceeds a
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threshold is employed:
L(h) = log
(
pσ1(h;H1)
pσ0(h;H0)
)
> γ (6.4)
However σ1 is not known in our case. In this case, it is well known that the GLR
test which replaces σ1 with its MLE estimate is asymptotically the uniformly most
powerful among all tests [127]. Hence the scheme resorts to the GLR test that uses
the MLE of σ1 denoted by σˆ1. Estimation is done over the elements in block h. The
MLE for σ21 is given by:
σˆ21 =
1
2N
k∑
i=j
h2i (6.5)
Substituting (5) in (4) and simplifying yields:
L(h) =
(
2Nσ20
λ
)N
e
(
λ
2σ20
−N
)
(6.6)
where λ =
∑k
i=j h
2
i .
The use of multiple antenna modes will result in M different channel realizations
at each time instant. The environment ‘seen’ by the different modes of the antennas
will be different due to the differences in their radiation patterns and therefore the
distribution for each of these M channel realizations will be characterized by different
σ’s. Assuming that the channel realizations yielded by the different antenna modes
are independent, we can now write
L(h) = log
(
M∏
m=1
pσ1m(hm;H1)
pσ0m(hm;H0)
)
> γ (6.7)
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where σ0m and σ1m are the distributions’ parameters for mode m under the null and
alternate hypothesis respectively. hm represents the channel vector for mode m. The
decision function simplifies to:
L(h) =
M∑
m=1
[(
2Nσ20m
λm
)N
e
(
λ
2σ20m
−N
)]
(6.8)
where λm =
∑k
i=j h
2
im and him denotes the channel realization at time instant i for the
mth antenna mode. The control parameters that can be used to tune the performance
of this scheme are listed in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Control Parameters
Parameter Description
N Block size. Number of most recent consecutive channel estimates used
in the test including the estimate corresponding to the packet under
test.
NT Number of training packets used to estimate σ0 during connection ini-
tialization
γ Threshold. Can be set based on the values of L(h) observed during the
training phase.
ND Detection delay. Maximum number of packets from I within which it
should be detected. If detection doesn’t happen by this time, it is
considered a missed detection.
NF Number of packets from T before I takes over. Though this is not a
controllable parameter in real time, it has a critical effect on the false
alarm rate.
M Number of antenna modes.
A graphical depiction of these parameters are shown w.r.t a sample evolution of
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L(h) in Fig. 6.2.
Training Sequence Friendly Packets 
Friendly Packets 
Stop and Intruder 
Packets Start 
Threshold 
False Alarm 
Intruder Detection 
Figure 6.2: Sample evolution of the GLR test. NT = 25, NF=100, N=5, M=1.
Threshold in this case is chosen to be the the maximum of L(h) observed during
training.
Steps of the detection scheme:
1. During the outset of the session, R estimates σ0 through training. The number
of packets used for training is denoted by NT .
2. R also computes L(h) for j = i − N + 1 and k = i based on these channel
estimates at each instant i (N ≤ i ≤ NT ).
3. Actual transmissions begin from T and R continues to compute L(h) for each
packet transmission. I is assumed to hijack this connection and starts transmit-
ting to R after NF transmissions from T.
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4. Based on these computed L(h) during the training phase, a threshold γ is picked
such that an alarm is raised whenever L(h) > γ.
5. In the event of an alarm, a higher layer re-authentication procedure can be
evoked to reverify the identity of the transmitter.
6.4.1 Threshold selection:
The value of γ will be chosen based on the values observed for L(h) during the training
period. If the maximum value of L(h) observed during training is LM(h), γ can be
expressed as KLM(h) where K is the scaling factor that needs to be controlled in
order to achieve the desired detection and false alarm rates. In this scheme, selection
of K is performed in an adaptive manner. It is started with with K = 1 and it’s
value is gradually increased till an acceptable false alarm rate is achieved.
The connection can be vulnerable to an attack during this threshold selection
phase as well. Therefore higher layer authentication protocols (e.g. 802.11i) should
be evoked to verify false alarms during this adaptation process to ensure security until
the target value of K is reached though this may cause some processing overhead due
to frequent re-authentication. Optionally, depending on the level of threat to which
the network is exposed to, this re-authentication process can be relaxed during this
adaptive threshold determination phase for more efficient operation and all alarms
may be treated as false alarms.
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6.5 Channel Measurements
The same set of channel measurements described in Chapter 5 were used to in this
study this scheme as well. Please refer to Section 5.5 for the measurement setup
and Appendices C and B for details on the reconfigurable antenna and measurement
technique.
6.6 Why Rayleigh Distribution?
It has been assumed that the channel amplitudes follow a Rayleigh distribution in-
stead of the more general Ricean distribution for the purposes of this study. In order
to justify this assumption, the empirical distribution functions obtained for each link
from the measured data was compared to a Rayleigh or Ricean distribution whose
parameters were estimated from the measurements. The similarity between the em-
pirical distribution (pe) and standard distribution (pp) for each link is quantified
through two metrics: the total variation distance between the distributions and the
KullbackLeibler (KL) divergence.
The total support S is defined as:
min(Se, Sp) ≤ S ≤ max(Se, Sp) (6.9)
where Se and Sp are the supports of the empirical and standard distributions re-
spectively. S is discretized into T evenly spaced discrete points. The total variation
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distance between the two distributions is defined as:
e =
1
2
T∑
t=1
|pe(ht)− pp(ht)| (6.10)
where pe(ht) and pp(ht) denote the values of the distributions evaluated at the t
th
discrete point in S. The KL divergence between pe and pp is defined as:
DKL (pe‖pp) =
T∑
t=1
pe(ht)log2
pe(ht)
pp(ht)
(6.11)
Table 6.2 lists the trends in the observed values over all the measured links for
the difference between the empirical distribution and the two standard distributions.
Table 6.2: Difference between Empirical and Parametric Distributions
Distribution Mean of e Standard Deviation of e Mean KL Divergence
Rayleigh 0.059 0.014 1.56
Ricean 0.036 0.014 0.32
As it can be observed, though the channel distributions are not ‘purely’ Rayleigh
nor Ricean, which is to be expected, they resemble these distributions sufficiently
enough which provides us with the ability to develop an analytical framework for
the problem. Moreover, as the values indicate, on average, due to the combination
of LOS and NLOS of links, modeling the channel as Rayleigh does not lead to a
large error compared to modeling it as Ricean in the system, though the observed
distributions marginally resemble the Ricean distribution more than the Rayleigh.
Nevertheless, Rayleigh distribution was picked over Ricean for three reasons. Closed
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form MLE estimates do not exist for the parameters that characterize Ricean distri-
butions and it requires recursive methods that are computationally intense [128]. The
second reason is that when small values of N are used in the scheme, the recursive
scheme does not achieve convergence resulting in very poor estimates that will have
a significantly negative effect on the scheme’s performance. Finally a simpler form of
GLRT function cannot be formulated due to the Bessel functions that characterize
Ricean distributions which will lead to higher computational complexity. Based on
these observations and reasons, the channel was modeled as Rayleigh distributed.
6.7 Analysis and Results
The performance of the intrusion detection scheme was studied in terms of the prob-
ability of missed detection (β) and false alarm rates (α) as a function of the different
control parameters listed in Section 6.4. α and β characteristics presented in this
section were computed from the measured channels as follows:
1. For each (R,T, I) combination, a detection threshold γ was obtained through
the first NT training samples.
2. For the NF subsequent samples from T, the number of instances where L(h) ex-
ceeds γ was recorded. A false alarm was recorded when the number of instances
was greater than one.
3. The friendly samples were followed by samples from I. A detection was recorded
if L(h) exceeds γ within the first NI transmissions from I. If not, a miss was
recorded.
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4. This process was repeated for 100 trials with different subsets of friendly and
adversary samples and the average α and β were computed.
5. The overall α and β were computed as the average obtained over all possible
(R,T, I) combinations.
Unless specifically stated otherwise, the presented results also reflect the average
over the different antenna combinations possible for a given M . i.e., for a given α, the
presented missed detection probabilities are averages obtained over the
(
5
M
)
possible
combinations for a given M .
6.7.1 Single Antenna Mode (M = 1)
Figure 6.3 shows the average detection error tradeoff (DET) curves for a single an-
tenna mode for different values of block size N . The non linear scaling of the axes in
a DET curve is designed to yield a straight line when L(h) from the system follows a
normal distribution [129]. The diagonal line defined by β = −α represents completely
random performance and curves that lie on the quadrant left of this line represent
positive levels of performance.
It can be observed that the performance improves with block size. This is due to
two reasons. A larger block size gives a better estimate for σ1 and hence when the
the intruder starts injecting packets, the difference between σ0 and σ1 becomes more
clear which in turn results in L(h) growing above the threshold rapidly. Moreover
when N is large, the increased contribution from channels corresponding to I in L(h)
after the intrusion will result in a rapid increase in its value as well.
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Moreover, the values of N used in the computation of L(h) are not sufficiently
large enough to yield a Gaussian behavior and therefore the DET curves do not
exhibit a linear trend. While such a Gaussian behavior is preferred since it allows
us to resort to standard normal distributions to set the threshold γ, it will not be
possible to employ a sufficiently large N to yield this behavior since a meaningful
minimum detection delay ND is determined by the block size.
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Figure 6.3: Average DET curves for a single antenna (M = 1) mode for different
values of N . ND is equal to N for each curve. NT = 25. For a given α, β decreases
with the block size. However at low α levels, the corresponding β levels remain
unacceptably high for a single antenna mode even at relatively large block sizes.
However with just a single antenna mode, the achievable detection rates are unac-
ceptably low at low α regions. In cases where σ1 are σ0 not well separated, the level
of increase in L(h) after intrusion will be not sufficient enough to match the γ that
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is required to maintain a low α which in turn leads to poor detection rates. To gain
insights into this the maximum percentage difference between σ’s among the different
antenna modes is defined as:
P = max
m=1,...,M
|σ1m − σ0m|
σ0m
× 100% (6.12)
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Figure 6.4: CDF of P for different values of M . The support and mean shifts
toward higher values with increasing M .
Figure 6.4 shows the CDF of P for different values of M . Table 6.3 lists some
of the quantities extracted from these CDFs. When a single antenna mode is em-
ployed, the mean maximum percentage difference is 75.5% and the probability of this
percentage difference being greater than 100% is as low as 0.07. This observation
clearly elucidates the challenge with designing a GLRT based detection scheme using
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a single antenna. Though the links can be differentiated in terms of σ, the amount
of separation in σ0 and σ1 may not be sufficient in any given scenario for the GLRT
to yield acceptable performance levels with a single antenna mode.
Table 6.3: Statistics Pertaining to P from Measured Links
M =1 M = 2 M = 3 M = 4 M = 5
Mean (P ) 75.5 95.8 105.6 111.7 116.1
Median 76.2 86.6 88.9 90.4 91.5
Pr(P ≤ 100) 0.93 0.89 0.86 0.84 0.82
Figure 6.5 shows the variation of probability of detection as a function of detection
delay in terms of number of packets. Understandably detection rate improves with
the allowable detection delay. However it should be noted that timely detection of
the intruder is very critical and therefore ND cannot be increased to arbitrarily large
values to achieve the required detection rates. Again it can also be observed that
the performance improves with block size. However, to be effective, higher values of
N require that the detection delay to be at least as long as the block size so that
the block will contain samples entirely from the intruder. The effect of N being less
than the detection delay can be observed by the dotted lines in Fig. 6.5 where the
detection performance is significantly deteriorated.
The false alarm rate, as a function of the number of friendly transmissions from T
before I takes over is shown in Fig. 6.6. As one would expect, the chances of raising
a false alarm rises with more friendly packets. A larger N results in a better estimate
for σ0 during the training phase. Additionally it will yield a value for σ(h) that is
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Figure 6.5: Variation of detection probability with ND for a single antenna
(M) = 1) mode at α = 0.05. NT = 25. ND is equal to N for each curve. The
dashed segments correspond to points where ND < N . Longer delays result in
only marginal improvements in detection. Larger N improves performance, but
the minimum required detection delay is longer for larger N ’s.
closer to the true σ0 as well. Thus the probability of L(h) to exceed γ picked based
on the the estimated σ0 will be lower and hence α improves with N .
To summarize the preceding trends, higher N lowers α while improving detection
rates. Though a longer detection delay can help detection rates, in practice it is
undesirable to have such long delays. However due to the marginal difference between
the σ values for the T− R and T− I links, it is challenging to obtain acceptable
detection rates while keeping the false alarm rates very low when using a single mode
antenna system. Hence the scheme resorts to multi-mode antenna systems.
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Figure 6.6: Variation of α with NF for a single antenna (M) = 1) mode at β =
0.05. NT = 25. ND is equal to N for each curve. Longer number of transmissions
from T increases the probability of false alarms. Larger N improves performance
due to better σ0 estimates.
6.7.2 Multiple Antenna Modes
Figure 6.7 shows the DET curves achievable through the combination of channel
information corresponding to multiple antenna modes. For each incoming packet,
L(h) is computed as in (8) based on the channel information corresponding to the
chosen M configurations from which subsequent detection rates and false alarm rates
are computed. It can be clearly seen that the detection rate significantly improves
with the number of modes for a given α. Referring again to Fig. 6.4 and Table 6.3,
it can be observed that the maximum percentage difference between σ’s among the
different antenna modes increases with M . This is by virtue of the fact that different
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antenna modes will exhibit different σ values and hence the probability that the
difference between σ0 and σ1 is very small for all the modes will be lower. Thus modes
that exhibit a larger difference in σ will contribute more to the GLR test resulting
in better performance. Increasing M increases the probability of finding modes that
exhibit a larger difference in σ’s and hence performance significantly improves with
M . Again due to the lower value of N , a non-Gaussian trend is observed in the
observed DET curves.
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Figure 6.7: Average DET curves for a multiple antenna modes for N = ND
= 10. NT = 25. For a given α, β decreases with increasing number of antenna
modes. Acceptable levels of β can be achieved at low α levels by using multiple
antenna modes.
Figure 6.8 shows the achievable detection rates as function of detection delay for
the different M values. Comparing this with Fig. 6.5, it can be seen that the level of
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improvement achievable in detection rates is quite high with M than N . For example,
by increasing N from 10 to 25 results in a mere 5% improvement in detection when
a single mode is used. Moreover this improvement comes at the cost of a longer
detection delay. By introducing an additional mode, β can be lowered from around
20% to 9 % while keeping N and ND at 10.
Figure 6.9 shows α as a function of the number of friendly packets. As described
in step (2) in Section 6.7, α is defined as the probability that there will be at least one
packet that exceeds the threshold γ during the friendly transmissions. Improvements
in α is also observed with increasing M . Naturally false alarms increase with increas-
ing friendly packets regardless of M . For relatively smaller values of N and a single
antenna mode, when certain samples in h come from the tail region of the underlying
Rayleigh distribution, the resulting estimate of σˆ1 can significantly diverge from σ0
resulting in excursions of L(h) above the threshold γ. However, when multiple an-
tenna modes are employed, the probability that the channels corresponding to most
of the modes belong to the tail region at any given instant is reduced. Therefore at
every time instant, the “well-behaved” modes help dampen the hikes in σˆ1 due to the
“stray” modes and therefore help keep the excursions of σˆ1 above γ low and hence
reduce the probability of false alarm.
6.7.3 Which Modes to Choose?
From the previous results is is clear that introducing multiple antenna modes improves
the system’s overall performance. However these results do not provide insights on
how to pick the mode combinations and most importantly if there is any benefit in
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Figure 6.8: Variation of detection probability with ND for multiple antenna
modes at α = 0.05. N = ND = 10. NT = 25. As observed in Fig. 6.5, longer
delays result in only marginal improvements in detection. More antenna modes
however results in better detection rates without requiring longer detection delays.
increasing the number of modes beyond a certain level. Some insights to this problem
can be found by analyzing Fig. 6.10 and Table 6.4. Table 6.4 (Table 5.1 repeated
for reading convenience) lists the spatial pattern correlation that exists between the
radiation patterns corresponding to the different antenna modes used in the study.
The best, worst and average detection rates achieved by different individual mode
combinations for M = 2 and M = 3 are shown in the figure. For M = 2, it is
evident that the detection rate is a function of the antenna correlation coefficient.
The best performance is achieved by the mode combination (5,1) which also has the
lowest correlation between patterns. The combination with the highest correlation of
0.82 achieves the worst performance. Similarly for M = 3, detection rates exhibit the
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Figure 6.9: Variation of α with NF for multiple antenna modes at β = 0.05.
NT = 25. ND is equal to N for each curve. α decreases with M .
same trend with respect to the average correlation between the different pair of modes
within the combinations. Moreover it can be seen that the performance achieved by
the best combination for M = 3 outperforms the M = 5 case as well.
The preceding behavior can attributed to the well known phenomenon of decor-
related antenna patterns resulting in decorrelated channel realizations [130]. The
information provided by more decorrelated channel realizations serves to improve the
‘quality’ of L(h) and hence enables the scheme to distinguish between T and I more
accurately.
Based on these trends, two guidelines are suggested for picking the different an-
tenna modes. Antenna modes should be picked such that the pattern correlation
coefficient between the different modes should be kept as low as possible. Many re-
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configurable antenna architectures exist that can generate patterns with a very low
correlation coefficient between their modes [23, 131]. The second is that, adding new
modes will improve detection rates as long as the newly introduced mode does not
diminish the average correlation coefficient among the modes. This can be seen by
observing the different circled pairs of DET curves in Fig. 6.10, where adding a new
mode improves detection when the addition of the mode lowers the average correlation
coefficient among the modes.
Table 6.4: Pattern correlation coefficients between different modes of the LWA
Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3 Mode 4 Mode 5
Mode 1 1 0.73 0.42 0.10 0.06
Mode 2 0.73 1 0.82 0.27 0.07
Mode 3 0.42 0.82 1 0.55 0.11
Mode 4 0.10 0.27 0.55 1 0.56
Mode 5 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.56 1
6.7.4 Effect of Training
The quality of training will have a significant effect on the performance of the scheme
as the estimated σ0 forms the basis for the likelihood ratio based on which it oper-
ates. Figure 6.11 shows the effect of the amount of training on the DET curves. As
evidenced by the figure, longer training leads to better performance at the lower α
regions as expected. But interestingly more training has a negative effect on system
performance at the larger α regions. Recall that the threshold γ is computed as
KLM(h) where LM(h) is the maximum of L(h) observed during training. Longer
training on average leads to marginally larger values for LM(h). At high α regions,
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Figure 6.10: Average DET curves for different antenna mode combinations.
N = ND = 10. NT = 25. Detection rates have a direct correlation with the
correlation coefficient between the patterns of the employed antenna modes. For
a given M , lower correlation coefficient between the antenna patterns result in
better detection for a given α.
K ≈ 1 and hence the threshold γ is more sensitive to LM(h). Therefore for a given
α, keeping all other parameters constant while increasing only NT results in an in-
creased estimate of the threshold γ, which in turn deteriorates detection. Although
the estimate of σ0 does improve with NT , the increase in LM(h) overweighs its benefit
in the high α region leading to performance degradation. Nevertheless, meaningful
utilization of this scheme will involve operating in the low false alarm region and
therefore longer training will be still preferred.
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Figure 6.11: Average DET curves for M=1 and M=5 for different number of
training samples. N = ND = 10. Solid lines indicate M = 1 and dotted lines
indicate M = 5. Longer training results in better detection at lower α regions.
But the gains achieved from more training cannot match the gains achieved by
employing more number of antenna modes.
6.8 Comparison with Fingerprint Based Schemes
The GLRT based scheme differs from the fingerprint based schemes conceptually as
well as in implementation details.
The GLRT based scheme relies on detecting intrusion by directly observing the
statistics of the channel. It is well known that the GLRT based scheme is asymp-
totically optimal in the sense of probability of detection. i.e as N → ∞, β → 0
under H1 and α → 0 under H0. This implies that for large values of N , arbitrarily
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high detection rates can be achieved for a very low false alarm rate. However the
fingerprint based schemes operate on the statistics of the distances between channel
based fingerprints. It was noted in chapter 5 that closed form expressions for the
distributions of θ is not trivial to find and hence an asymptotic performance bound
cannot be stated for the proposed fingerprint based technique.
From a practical point of view, the fingerprint based schemes can be problematic
in environments with large channel variations since the possible range of θ under the
null hypothesis can to be too wide leading to large false alarm rates. However, large
number of channels samples are required by the GLRT based scheme to yield good
detection rates which may not be suitable in hostile environments where detection
delay can be a very critical factor. Inspection of the performance curves in the mea-
sured environment shows that the GLRT based schemes exhibit better performance
levels than the fingerprint based scheme when a large detection delay can be toler-
ated. Therefore the choice of scheme will be dictated by the kind of physical and
hostile environment in which they will operate in.
6.9 Practical Considerations
Some key practical issues need to be considered in order to make this scheme work in
practice. The most critical issue is the problem of obtaining channel estimates over
all the antenna modes on a packet-by-packet basis. This issue was address in Section
5.8 where a frame structure was proposed to efficiently obtain these channel estimates
(Fig. 5.12).
As noted previously this scheme is proposed to complement existing higher level
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security protocols. Therefore such protocols should continue to play their role in
protecting the wireless link. An adaptive approach can be pursued when the GLR
test triggers an alarm at the physical layer. When an alarm is raised by the physical
layer scheme, the system can reconfigure the GLR test to operate in a point on the
DET curve that prioritizes low missed detection over false alarms. Subsequent alarms
should be handled by the the upper layer authentication protocols such as 802.11i
till it is ensured that the perceived threat does not exist after which point the GLR
test can prioritize over false alarms again. Moreover successfully adapting the alarm
threshold will also rely on these re-authentication protocols.
Channel statistics may also gradually change with time which can lead to arbi-
trarily high false alarm rates. Periodic retraining can be implemented to keep the
system performance within acceptable levels. Therefore this scheme can benefit from
more comprehensive training algorithms that continually update σ0 based on packets
that pass the intrusion detection test at the physical as well as upper layers.
An important class of considerations arise from the suitability of the Rayleigh
channel model under different conditions. Although it was shown that the channels
follow this model reasonably well on average, applying a GLRT based on the pre-
cise distribution that models the channel can greatly enhance the performance of the
scheme. Moreover in keyhole channels [132] which are frequently observed in scenar-
ios where the communicating ends lie in different rooms, there will not be sufficient
mulitpath components to yield a a Rayleigh distributed channel. Future enhance-
ments to the scheme can therefore include a prior step that estimates the type of
distribution corresponding to the transmitter link based on which it selects an ap-
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propriate decision function which can lead to improvements in intrusion detection
rates.
6.10 Conclusion
An intrusion detection scheme that utilizes physical layer information based on a
reconfigurable antenna was proposed. The intrusion detection problem was setup
as a generalized likelihood ratio test under the assumption of Rayleigh fading chan-
nels for different antenna modes. The assumption was justified based on channel
measurements gathered in an indoor environment using a network analyzer. The
measurements were then used to study the performance of the scheme as a function
of several control parameters available to the user. It was observed that large block
sizes lower false alarm rates while yielding high detection rates as well. By utilizing
multiple modes in a reconfigurable antenna concurrently in the likelihood function,
it was shown that the detection rates can be improved and false alarm rates can be
decreased while keeping the block size low. The pattern correlation coefficient that
exists between the radiation patterns of the different antenna modes was shown to
have a direct correlation with the resulting detection performance, with lower pat-
tern correlation resulting in better performance. In networks with very limited or non
existent security such as public WiFi spots, the proposed scheme can add an easy
to implement layer of security that can provide improved levels of protection against
intrusion. In more secure networks operating in hostile environments, this scheme in
conjunction with existing higher layer based security mechanisms can provide a much
needed extra layer of security.
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Chapter 7: A Hybrid Channel Modeling Technique for
Location Specific Applications with Radiation Patterns
7.1 Introduction
Wireless channel models are often too complex or unsuited to analyze applications
that involve different antenna radiation patterns such as the proposed reconfigurable
antenna based security schemes. A new approach is developed in this chapter which
utilizes ray tracing results to generate a hybrid stochastic cluster channel model to
simulate site specific links while allowing for arbitrary antenna configuration at both
ends of the link. While temporal variations are modeled by the cluster channel model,
different radiation patterns allow the user to study site specific pattern and polariza-
tion diversity effects. The geometrical arrangement and the resulting locations of the
transmitter and receiver in the physical link captures the spatial effects of the envi-
ronment. Spectral effects are accounted for by introducing the notion of bandwidth
in the resulting power delay profiles. The validity of the model is analyzed through
two different applications that rely on the proposed approach: reconfigurable antenna
arrays for MIMO and antenna based physical layer security. The results are compared
with channel measurements made on a MIMO software defined radio (SDR) testbed
equipped with a reconfigurable antenna array. Measurements show agreement with
the simulated trends in both applications.
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7.2 Background
The wireless propagation channel can be considered the single most important compo-
nent of a wireless communication system in terms of its impact on system performance
[5]. Hence, any meaningful and accurate evaluation of a wireless system through sim-
ulations requires a channel model that effectively captures the underlying physical
phenomena present in the environment that is relevant to the application under con-
sideration. To this end, a multitude of deterministic, empirical and analytical models
have been proposed and employed by the wireless community over the years to model
the spatial, temporal and spectral features of the propagation channel. These channel
models can be broadly classified as site-specific or stochastic.
Stochastic channel models find applications in studies where the objective is to
characterize the system in a generalized environment. Examples for such generalized
environments include urban, suburban, a room with large delay spread, an audito-
rium, a satellite link etc. Stochastic methods are usually described analytically and
are derived based on empirical results [5, 6]. The simplest analytical model for narrow-
band channels is the Rayleigh fading model, which succeeds at modeling the temporal
variations due to the multi-path nature of the wireless channel. Other models for fast
fading include Ricean, Weibull and Nakagami models. Shadowing models such as the
log-normal model, along with path loss models such as the Okumura-Hata, COST-
Hata, Weissberger, or ITU model, are superposed on fast fading models to emulate
more realistic narrowband channels. To model the more complex frequency selective
nature of the wireless channel encountered in wideband applications, a tapped de-
105
lay line representation is employed. Simpler versions extend the narrowband fading
model by representing the impulse response of the channel as a sequence of exponen-
tially decaying Rayleigh fading taps in time. The widely adopted family of cluster
based channel models are based on the seminal works in [133, 134] and incorporate
the phenomenon of clustering of rays in time and angle.
MIMO wireless technology has enjoyed the limelight in recent times, leading to the
extension of the standard channel models to account for MIMO specific propagation
effects [74, 135]. These models attempt to characterize a key propagation effect not
accounted for in previously developed models, namely the spatial correlation. A
number of models including the Kronecker model, Weichselberger model and virtual
channel model attempt to do so with varying degrees of sophistication and complexity.
A plethora of standardized models have also been proposed for simulating MIMO
channels. A comprehensive survey of MIMO channel models can be found in [136].
Though analytical models allow users to study the behavior of wireless systems in
generalized environments without much specialized software or hardware tools, they
suffer from several drawbacks. Most models do not include or only partly include
critical aspects such as the effect of antenna patterns and polarizations, mutual cou-
pling effects in arrays, and the environment’s depolarizing effect (commonly expressed
by cross-polarization ratio). Models that do include most of these effects are highly
complex and do not allow simple implementations.
Contrary to stochastic channel models, site specific models contain information
specific to a particular environment. These models can be obtained through de-
terministic or empirical methods. Deterministic methods include ray tracing [137],
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ray launching [138] and FDTD [139]. Ubiquitous among these methods is ray trac-
ing, in which the amplitude, phase and time delay of the different paths for energy
propagation between the transmitter and receiver are precisely computed based on a
geometrical model of the environment under study and the material properties. The
main draw back of ray tracing is that the results do not contain information about
the statistical behavior of the environment and are usually treated as the ‘average’
channel between the communicating ends. Empirical methods involve extensive chan-
nel sounding measurements either in the time or frequency domains. The measured
channels tend to be very effective in capturing all relevant channel effects and can
be stored for playback during simulations. However, undertaking a comprehensive
channel sounding experiment can be very time consuming and expensive.
A third approach to channel modeling not commonly included in the discussion
of channel models is the hybrid technique of combining a deterministic model with
an empirical or analytical model to develop a more generic description of the site.
This approach leads to a stochastic description of an otherwise deterministic model
for a particular environment. Several studies have attempted to model the different
temporal and spectral effects seen in a specific site and add them back into ray tracing
results to generate a comprehensive site model. In [140], the authors have demon-
strated that it is possible to characterize the propagation channel by parameterizing
the environment via ray tracing. Such an approach is adopted in [141], where the ap-
pearance and disappearance of multipaths over time is modeled as a birth and death
process with ray tracing being used to extract the parameters required to build the
model. In [142], the authors have shown that autoregressive processes can be used
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to model the temporal variations in tap gains obtained from ray tracing simulations
to yield a stochastic model of the indoor environment. Numerous other works follow
this hybrid approach to model different aspects of the propagation environment by
combining the results of ray tracing with stochastic models to achieve a high fidelity
model to suit various applications [143–147].
Why Another Channel Modeling Technique?
The main limitation in using many of the hybrid techniques is the complexity in
their implementation. Most techniques are difficult to appreciate due to the lack
of an intuitive approach to modeling the physical channel. Furthermore, some of
these models depend on information obtained from measurements to introduce the
temporal and spectral variations. The purpose of this method is to apply the results
of ray tracing to derive a standard cluster channel model that includes the effect
of antenna patterns, antenna polarizations, and channel depolarization. The main
strength of this technique is its simplicity while manifesting the required spatial,
temporal and spectral features for link level simulations. The only specialized tool
required to implement this technique is ray tracing software. The single link model
can also simply be extended to model MIMO channels by considering ray tracing
results corresponding to the different antenna locations.
The main motivation behind developing this modeling approach is to simulate the
wireless channel for applications that involve reconfigurable antennas. There is no
simple modeling approach that allows the user to simulate and analyze the benefits of
such antennas in a given environment and, more importantly, match it with measured
108
data at the link level. Ray tracers do not scale well to problems that involve studying
several different antennas. The spatiotemporal effects of the reconfigurable antenna’s
channel need to be accounted for as well. On the other hand, most analytical models
cannot account for the antennas in addition to some of the environmental effects
pertaining to such antennas in a straightforward manner. Therefore, a new modeling
technique that is suitable for studying the relative performance of the different modes
in a reconfigurable antenna is developed.
In addition to the traditional applications of the reconfigurable antenna, studying
the proposed security schemes requires that the channel model goes beyond describing
the average environment in which the scheme operates and reveals information about
the unique characteristics of individual links. Due to the ease in which reconfigurable
antennas can be introduced, as well as its ability to bring forth the subtle differences
between the different antenna modes that are manifested in the resulting wireless
channel, this approach also renders well for evaluating channel based security schemes.
7.3 Channel Modeling Approach
7.3.1 Background: Cluster Channel Model
The time based cluster channel model was first proposed in [133] and later extended
to include angles in [134]. The model is based on the clustering effect seen on the
arriving rays in an indoor environment in terms of time of arrival and angle of arrival.
A cluster is defined as a group of rays that arrive within a narrow time frame from
the same angular space. One or many such clusters will be present in the power delay
profile (PDP), with the exact number of clusters dependent upon the link location
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within the environment. The impulse response of the channel can be written as:
h(t) =
C∑
c=1
Rc∑
r=1
βrce
jϕrcδ(t− Tc − τrc)δ(Ω− Ωc − ωrc) (7.1)
where c indexes the arriving clusters and r indexes the rays within each cluster. βrc,
assumed to be Rayleigh distributed, is the amplitude of the rth ray in the cth cluster
(β2rc will be the power gain), and ϕrc, assumed to be uniform in [0, 2pi), represents its
phase. The time of arrival for the cth cluster is given by Tc and the time of arrival for
the rth ray within the cth cluster is given by τrc. Therefore, the absolute time delay
of the rth ray in the cth cluster is given by Tc + τrc. Delays are measured relative to
the first cluster and first ray within each cluster (i.e., T1 and τ1c are assumed to be
zero). Ωc denotes the mean angle of arrival (AoA) for cluster c and ωrc denotes the
AoA of ray r within this cluster w.r.t. the mean AoA.
Based on observations, several parameters are extracted from this impulse re-
sponse to represent the cluster channel model in an abstract form. These parameters
and their descriptions are listed in Table 7.1.
The principal step in this modeling approach is to identify this clustering structure
and associated parameters from ray tracing results and represent each individual link
in a similar abstract model. Different realizations of the channel impulse response
can later be drawn from this model. The first step leading to extracting the model is
to obtain the ray tracing results which will be described in the proceeding section.
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Table 7.1: Parameters of the cluster channel model
Parameter Description
Λ Cluster arrival rate. An exponential distribution with parameter 1/Λ
will model the waiting period between cluster arrivals.
Γ Cluster decay time constant. Power gain of successive clusters will
decay exponentially at this rate.
λc Ray arrival rate for rays within cluster c. An exponential distribution
with parameter 1/λC will model the waiting period between ray arrivals.
γc Ray decay time constant for rays within cluster c. Power gain of suc-
cessive rays will decay exponentially at this rate.
Ωc Mean AoA for cluster c. In standard models only the azimuth angle
(φ) is considered with the elevation angle (θ) fixed at 90o.
σc Standard deviation of the Laplacian distribution that characterizes the
statistics of AoA w.r.t Ωc for rays within cluster c.
7.3.2 Ray Tracing Simulations
The ray tracing method has become a mainstay among tools used for the study of
energy propagation in RF systems, especially in the analysis of micro-cell and pico-cell
environments. The ray tracer used in this study is FASANT [121]. FASANT takes
three inputs: the environment geometry, material properties used in the geometry
features and antenna radiation patterns. Based on this information, for a given
transmitter and receiver location, FASANT generates the amplitude (β), phase (ϕ),
time delay (τ), angle of arrival and departure in elevation (θ) and azimuth (φ) for
each ray to arrive at the destination from the originating point.
Since one of the primary goals of this modeling technique is to be able to apply
different radiation patterns, it is imperative that the information obtained through the
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ray tracer be independent of any specific antenna. Hence, isotropic antenna patterns
are employed for all ray tracing simulations. This makes the process more efficient
since a library of PDPs for different links computed one time can be repeatedly reused
with different radiation patterns.
The wireless channel has a depolarizing effect due to scattering and therefore,
energy launched through a linearly polarized antenna will arrive at the receiver with
energy spread across both polarizations. This effect is usually quantified by the envi-
ronment’s cross-polarization ratio (XPR) [148]. In order to study the environment’s
depolarization effects through ray tracing, two sets of results were obtained for each
link. For the first set, the ray tracer was run with isotropic radiation patterns with
unity gain in the vertical (V ) polarization and with the same gain in the horizontal
(H) polarization for the second. Figures 7.1 (a)-(b) show the PDP obtained from
FASANT for both cases for a randomly chosen link in the test environment described
later in Section 7.5.1. Understandably in both cases, the same number of rays and
the same associated arrival times and angles (angles not shown in the figure) are
observed since these parameters depend only on the geometrical properties of the
environment when an isotropic antenna is employed. Depolarization can be clearly
observed in each ray, as they contain energy in both polarizations although the en-
ergy was transmitted only on one polarization. Figure 7.1(c) shows the amplitude
ratios between the co-polar and cross-polar component amplitudes and therefore the
degree of depolarization that exists in each ray for both the cases. It reveals that
the bulk of the energy arrives in the same polarization as it was transmitted, though
a finite amount of energy is transfered to the cross-polarization by the environment.
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Moreover, it can also be observed that the degree of depolarization is a function of
the transmit polarization as well. This can be attributed to the combination of the
geometry, the resulting scattering mechanisms and material properties of the environ-
ment. Finally, Fig. 7.1(d) shows the ratio between the two co-polarized components
(H/V ) observed in both scenarios. Again, it can be observed that the different po-
larizations are effected differently though the energy travels along the same path in
the environment. The collective observations seen in Fig. 7.1(a-d) dictate that any
channel model should account for all these affects in a meaningful way.
7.3.3 Modeling Methodology
The idea behind the hybrid channel model is to form a statistical description of
energy propagation for each link based on the ray tracing results. This description
is provided through the cluster channel model. Based on the information obtained
from ray tracing, the impulse response in (1) can be written as:
h(t) =
C∑
c=1
Rc∑
r=1
βrce
jϕrcδ(Θ−Θdc − θdrc)δ(Φ− Φdc − φdrc)
δ(t− Tc − τrc)δ(Θ−Θac − θarc)δ(Φ− Φac − φarc) (7.2)
where the superscripts a and d denote departure and arrival angles. Θc and Φc denote
the mean angle in θ and φ for the clusters. βrc corresponds to the ray amplitude
resulting from an isotropic antenna with unity power gain in both polarizations.
Noting that the delay and angular parameters of each incoming ray will remain the
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Figure 7.1: PDP observed for a sample link with (a) vertically polarized isotropic
antenna and (b) horizontally polarized isotropic antenna. The solid lines denote the
co-polar components and dotted lines denote the cross-polar components. (c) shows the
ratio between the cross-polar and co-polar components seen in (a) and (b). The solid
lines denote the horizontally polarized isotropic antenna and dotted lines the vertically
polarized one. (d) shows the ratio between the two co-polar components seen in (a)
and (b)
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same across both polarizations, we can now decompose (2) as:

hV (t)
hH(t)
 =
C∑
c=1
R∑
r=1

βVrce
jϕVrc
βHrce
jϕHrc
 δ(Θ−Θ
d
c − θdrc)
δ(Φ− Φdc − φdrc)δ(t− Tc − τrc)
δ(Θ−Θac − θarc)δ(Φ− Φac − φarc) (7.3)
where hV and hH denote the channel corresponding to V and H polarizations.
Similarly βVrc and β
H
rc represent the V and H components of the ray amplitude with
ϕVrc and ϕ
H
rc being the corresponding phases. The net amplitude and phase can be
related to the two polarized components as:
βrce
jϕrc = βVrce
jϕVrc + βHrce
jϕHrc (7.4)
Two ratios associated with the two polarization components are defined. The
cross-polarization amplitude ratio (XPAR) for a given ray when an isotropic antenna
with a single polarization is used is defined as:
RX =
βXrc
βCrc
(7.5)
where the superscripts C andX denote co and cross-polarizations. The co-polarization
amplitude ratio (CPAR) for a given ray when an isotropic antenna with dual polar-
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izations is used is defined as:
RC =
βHrc
βVrc
(7.6)
Presumably, XPAR and CPAR will have temporal variations in a practical environ-
ment. Hence, probability distributions will be employed to model them which will be
described in detail in Section 7.3.4.
For each simulated link the parameters listed in Table 7.2 based on the observed
power delay profiles were computed and recorded . The steps involved in generating
them are described in the following sections.
7.3.4 Parameter Extraction
Cluster Identification
Rays arrive in clusters and each cluster is identified by the general distribution of
their arrival time and AoA. Various methods have been tried for cluster identifica-
tion including hidden Markov models [149], LS linear regression [150], wavelets [151]
and manual visual inspection [134], though there has been no consensus on the best
method. Due to the deterministic nature of the data, the K-means clustering tech-
nique is used to identify the clusters. K-means clustering is a well known unsupervised
learning algorithm for machine learning based clustering problems [152]. The ratio-
nale behind applying this technique for this problem is based on the intuition that
rays that arrive within a time window from the same directions are very likely to have
propagated through the same region in space.
Naturally, τrc, φ
a
rc and θ
a
rc were the features used for identifying the clusters. τrc’s
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Table 7.2: Parameters of the cluster channel model
Parameter Description
Λ Cluster arrival rate (refer to Table 7.1)
Γ Cluster decay time constant (refer to in Table 7.1)
λc Ray arrival rate within cluster c (refer to Table 7.1)
γc Ray decay time constant within cluster c (refer to Table 7.1)
Φac Mean AoA in azimuth for cluster c.
σaφc Standard deviation of AoA in azimuth for cluster c assuming a Lapla-
cian distribution
Θac Mean AoA in elevation for cluster c.
σaθc Standard deviation of AoA in elevation for cluster c assuming a Gaus-
sian distribution
Φdc Mean AoD in azimuth for cluster c.
σdφc Standard deviation of AoD in azimuth for cluster c assuming a Lapla-
cian distribution
Θdc Mean AoD in elevation for cluster c.
σdθc Standard deviation of AoD in elevation for cluster c assuming a Gaus-
sian distribution
fc(RX) Empirical pdf of observed XPAR in cluster c
fc(RC) Empirical pdf of observed CPAR in cluster c
βφ00, β
θ
00 φ and θ component amplitudes of the first cluster
for the entire link were normalized to one and the angles were normalized to 2pi in
order to obtain fair weighting of the features during the clustering process. The
number of clusters was determined iteratively starting with a single cluster. The
maximum number of clusters was limited to six so as to be consistent with measured
values reported in literature [133, 134]. At every iteration, all model parameters were
computed, which in turn informed about the validity of the number of clusters. It
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was observed that the computed parameters begin to take on values inconsistent with
the general profile of the model after a threshold is exceeded. The iterations were
stopped upon reaching this point of inconsistency.
Cluster and Ray Power Decay Constants
With the clusters identified, we can now start by gathering and sorting all the rays
corresponding to each cluster in order of increasing delay. The peak ray in each
cluster was identified. Γ is obtained by performing a least squares exponential curve
fit based on cluster power gains and arrival times. Similarly, the peak ray and the
subsequent rays within the cluster were used to estimate an exponential curve fit to
obtain γc for each cluster.
Amplitude of First Cluster
The amplitude of the first cluster (β00) was also recorded, as it was required to deter-
mine the amplitudes of the subsequent rays during channel regeneration. Moreover,
in the absence of a LOS component, it provides information about the degree of path
loss that exists in the link.
Cluster and Ray Arrival Rates
The arrival times of the peak rays in each cluster were considered as the cluster arrival
times. Cluster arrivals are assumed to follow a Poisson arrival process and therefore
the waiting times between arrivals follow an exponential distribution with parameter
1/Λ. Λ was estimated by computing the MLE estimate for 1/Λ given by the mean
of the waiting times. Similarly, the waiting times between the rays within a cluster
were used to obtain λc’s.
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Angle of Arrival in Azimuth
Numerous studies have verified that the AoA in the azimuth w.r.t. the mean follows
a truncated Laplacian distribution. Φac is the algebraic mean of the azimuthal AoA’s
associated with each ray belonging to the cluster. The MLE estimate for σaφc is given
by 1
Rc
∑Rc
r=1 |φarc|.
Angle of Arrival in Elevation
Many simplistic channel models assume that the AoA to be confined to the azimuth
plane and thus θarc is usually taken to be 90
o. However, it has been observed that
θarc in fact follows a Gaussian distribution in real environments [153]. Hence, we
modeled it as a Gaussian random variable with mean Θac and standard deviation σ
a
θc
for each cluster. The mean and standard deviation were obtained from standard MLE
estimates for a Gaussian distributions.
Angle of Departure
The AoAs and AoDs will exhibit the same statistical behavior by virtue of the recipro-
cal nature of wireless channels. Therefore, the the azimuth and elevation components
of the AoD were assumed to follow a truncated Laplacian and Gaussian distributions
respectively. The corresponding parameters were computed from the AoD results of
the ray tracer.
Polarization Amplitude Ratios
In this approach, information about XPAR and CPAR is retained in the form of
empirical distributions for each cluster. The values observed for RX in rays belonging
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to cluster c were gathered to form fc(RX) for the two cases where the isotropic trans-
mit antenna was either purely vertically polarized or purely horizontally polarized.
Though RX can be defined separately for the two polarizations, there were no signifi-
cant discernible differences in the observed distributions for both cases and therefore,
were combined to provide a distribution with a higher resolution in its support. Sim-
ilarly, the values observed for RC across the two cases for rays within a cluster were
combined to form fc(RC). However, if any standard distributions can be associated
with these two quantities from extensive measurement campaigns, adopting it to this
modeling approach would be trivial.
LOS
Unlike the NLOS rays that will be subjected to scattering effects, if present, the LOS
component will be time invariant and may be subjected only to shadowing by moving
objects. Hence, the LOS component is treated as a separate entity with associated
values of βLOS, φ
a
LOS, θ
a
LOS, φ
d
LOS and θ
d
LOS. The LOS component will necessarily be
the first to arrive and therefore the time difference between the LOS and the first
cluster is also recorded in the cluster model. In the absence of a LOS component, the
arrival time of the first cluster will be taken as 0.
With the aid of this model, the wireless channel ‘seen’ by the transmitting and
receiving isotropic antennas has been converted from a purely deterministic one to
one that is stochastic in nature. As stated earlier, by modeling each link separately,
one can utilize it to study position specific applications which will be considered in
Sections 7.5 and 7.6.
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7.4 Channel Generation
It shoule be noted that in a practical system, the sampling rate of the receiver,
which will be direct function of the bandwidth (B), dictates the smallest resolvable
time delay (Td) between the incoming rays. Assuming Nyquist sampling rate, the
relationship between the two quantities is given by [5]:
Td =
1
2B
(7.7)
Rays that have an inter-arrival time delay that is less than Td will be resolved together
as one ray. The number of such ‘aggregated’ resolvable rays are termed as taps and
the number of taps is usually determined by the delay spread of the environment.
For the simulated links, the delay spread varied between 9ns to 40ns. The number of
taps were limited to 6 in this study to yield a maximum width of 5Td in time for the
channel impulse responses. With this time span defined, the individual steps involved
in channel sample generation are described.
Cluster and Ray Arrival Times
The arrival time of the cth cluster is computed as:
Tc = Tc−1 +W (7.8)
where W ∼ exp(1/Λ). If a LOS component is present, T0 was set to the difference in
time recorded between the LOS and first cluster and is set to 0 when a LOS is not
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present. Within each cluster, the arrival time for the rth ray is similarly computed
as:
τrc = τr−1,c + w (7.9)
where w ∼ exp(1/λc). For each cluster, generation of rays is stopped when τrc ≥ Tc+1.
For the final cluster, ray generation is stopped when τrc ≥ 5Tb.
Cluster and Ray Amplitudes
The amplitude of the first cluster is set to β00. The amplitude of the c
th cluster is
determined as:
β21c = β
2
00e
−Tc/Γ (7.10)
and the amplitude of each ray is determined as:
β2rc = β
2
1ce
−τrc/γc (7.11)
AoA and AoD
The mean angular values for each cluster is specified by the recorded values of Θac ,
Φac , Θ
d
c and Φ
d
c . For each ray, AoA and AoD values w.r.t. their mean values are
generated from the following distributions: θarc ∼ Norm(0, σaθc), φarc ∼ Laplacian(σaφc),
θdrc ∼ Norm(0, σdθc), and φdrc ∼ Laplacian(σdφc)
Polarization Decomposition
To apply an arbitrary antenna radiation pattern, decomposition of the channel am-
plitudes into their V and H components is require. The βrc values computed in the
previous step will contain the effects of channel depolarization. In order to decom-
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pose the channel into its V and H components, we will resort to the distributions
that characterize the two polarization amplitude ratios. Based on randomly drawn
instances of RC and RX , the two components can be written as:
βVrc = βrc (7.12)
βHrc = ξβrc (7.13)
The computation of , ξ is shown in Appendix A. After drawing a random phase
for each component uniformly from [0, 2φ), the channel impulse response can now be
written as in (3).
7.4.1 Antenna Patterns
The impulse response generated from the previous steps correspond to an isotropic
antenna that radiates equally well in both polarizations. This response therefore
reflects all the propagation modes of the environment. However, once a real antenna
is introduced in the system, some propagation paths and polarizations will be better
exploited than others due to the directional gain and polarization characteristics of
the antenna. Therefore, the antenna effects will be introduced at the transmitter
and receiver at this stage of the modeling process. The electric field of the antenna
in the V and H polarizations in the (θ, φ) directions is denoted by EiV (θ, φ)e
jδi
(θ,φ)
and EiH(θ, φ)e
jψi
(θ,φ) respectively, where δi(θ,φ) and ψ
i
(θ,φ) are the corresponding phase
angles. i = d indicates the transmit antenna and i = a indicates the receive antenna.
With the antennas introduced, the channels can be now written as:
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
hV (t)
hH(t)
 =
C∑
c=1
Rc∑
r=1

αVrc
αHrc
 δ(Θ−Θ
d
c − θdrc)
δ(Φ− Φdc − φdrc)δ(t− Tc − τrc)
δ(Θ−Θac − θarc)δ(Φ− Φac − φarc) (7.14)
where

αVrc
αHrc
 =

EdV (Ω
d
rc)e
jδd
(Ωdrc)
EdH(Ω
d
rc)e
jψd
(Ωdrc)


βVrce
jϕVrc
βHrce
jϕHrc



EaV (Ω
a
rc)e
jδa
(Ωarc)
EaH(Ω
a
rc)e
jψa
(Ωarc)
 (7.15)
 denotes Hadamard product in the preceding expression. For notational conve-
nience, the following notation was introduced in the preceding expression: Ωirc =
(Θic + θ
i
rc,Φ
i
c + φ
i
rc).
In the case of directional radiation patterns, the beam orientation with respect to
the link direction can have significant impact on system performance. Thus, having
a degree of freedom to account for different antenna orientation in the model would
be beneficial. Any random rotation of the antenna w.r.t to the original link direction
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can be accounted for in (14) by introducing an additional angle of rotation to the
applied radiation patterns. Thus a rotation of Ωr = (θr, φr) can be included in the
model by modifying Ωirc to
Ωirc = (Θ
i
c + θ
i
rc ± θr,Φic + φirc ± φr) (7.16)
at the appropriate end of the link. The resulting channel will now include the ef-
fects of antenna radiation pattern, polarization and orientation in addition to the
environmental effects.
7.4.2 Binning into Taps
As discussed earlier in this section, the system will resolve multiple rays into single
taps based on the system sampling rate. After dropping the angular information, the
discrete time representation (assuming 6 taps) of the channel impulse response can
now be written as:
h[m] =
5∑
m=0
h(t−mTb) (7.17)
where
h(t−mTb) =
Tc+τrc<(m+1)Tb∑
Tc+τrc≥mTb
αrcδ(t− Tc − τrc) (7.18)
where αrc = α
V
rc + α
H
rc.
7.4.3 MIMO Channels
A Nr×Nt MIMO channel denoted by HNr×Nt consists of NrNt parallel channels each
with a unique impulse response representation as in (17). Spatial correlation between
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these channels plays an important part on MIMO system performance and therefore,
various models have been proposed in literature to model it truthfully [136]. Spatial
correlation is influenced primarily by the inter element distances at the transmitter
and receiver, or in other words, their absolute location in the environment. Ray
tracing yields particularly well to capturing the spatial correlation in MIMO channels
since the positions of the multiple antennas are specified explicitly in simulations.
Concurrent multiple antenna positions at the transmitter and receiver are facilitated
in FASANT in a very straight forward manner. Therefore, this approach is extended
to include MIMO systems using the following steps:
1. Obtain ray tracing results corresponding to the NrNt channels, each with a
different transmit and receive antenna position
2. Generate a model for each of these channels as outlined in Section 7.3.4
3. Generate channel samples for each stream as described in Section 7.4 and apply
the corresponding radiation patterns as described in Section 7.4.1
It should be noted that all relevant antenna effects including pattern diversity,
polarization diversity and mutual coupling will be accounted for by applying radiation
patterns that are measured or simulated in the presence of the adjacent antenna.
This brings the discussion on the channel modeling process to a closure. The ap-
proach developed in the preceding sections will be now employed to generate channels
to analyze and compare the performance of two applications with measured results.
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7.5 Application I: MIMO System Analysis
The first application that is considered is a 2 × 2 MIMO system equipped with re-
configurable antennas. The objective is to demonstrate that the developed approach
will achieve the actual relative performances of the different antenna configuration
combinations in terms of link channel capacities.
7.5.1 Channel Measurements
The atrium located on the third floor of the Bossone Research Enterprise Building
on Drexel University’s campus was chosen as the environment for this study. Mea-
surements were performed for 6 different links. The environment and transmitter and
receiver locations are shown in Fig. 7.2. The chosen site is by no means a represen-
tative for any arbitrary type of environment. Instead, the objective of this study is
to demonstrate that this modeling technique works well for this site and, by virtue of
the absence of site specific assumptions, can be applied to any other site as well.
The measurements were made using two WARP nodes. The WARP testbed is
a 2 × 2 MIMO orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) communication
system used to prototype physical (PHY) and medium access control (MAC) layer
protocols [154]. Measurements were performed on channel 1 of the 802.11 band,
which is centered at 2.412 GHz with a 20 MHz bandwidth. Channel estimation was
performed via BPSK modulated training symbols. Details of the WARP platform is
provided in Appendix E.
The reconfigurable antenna used in this study is the reconfigurable circular patch
antenna (RCPA) [23]. Changing the radius of the RCPA by toggling the state of the
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Link 1
Link 2
Link 3
Link 4
Link 5Link 6
Transmitters
Receivers
Figure 7.2: Layout of environment used in the ray tracing simulations and mea-
surements. Two transmitter and five receiver locations are chosen to yield a total of 6
links.
PIN diodes on the structure results in the antenna to operate in the TM030 (Mode
3) or TM040 (Mode 4) modes, which induces two different radiation patterns. The
antenna also has two ports that induce orthogonal radiation patterns with respect
to each other for a given mode and serves as a 2 antenna system within a same
physical structure. The orthogonality between the patterns at the two ports result
in a low pattern correlation coefficient that is preferred in systems reliant on pattern
diversity to improve performance. The antenna patterns were measured in an anechoic
chamber and various antenna effects such as mutual coupling between the ports and
cross-polarization are being accounted for in these patterns.
Measurements were carried out for the 4 different antenna configuration combi-
nations listed in Table 7.3.
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Table 7.3: RCPA port configurations at the transmitter and receiver side.
RCPA Configurations
Mode Index Tx Port 1 / Port 2 Rx Port 1 / Port 2
a Mode 3 / Mode 3 Mode 3 / Mode 3
b Mode 3 / Mode 3 Mode 4 / Mode 4
c Mode 4 / Mode 4 Mode 3 / Mode 3
d Mode 4 / Mode 4 Mode 4 / Mode 4
500 time snapshots were recorded for each mode at every link. During each snap-
shot, the channels corresponding to the 4 modes were recorded sequentially before
advancing to the next snapshot. The antenna modes were switched through a voltage
module that is controlled by the WARP testbed.
7.5.2 Simulated Channels
Ray tracing results corresponding to the set of links that were described in Section
7.5.1 were simulated with careful attention to ensure that the antenna orientations and
locations closely matched the measurements. These results were used to generate a
model for each link as described in Section 7.3.4. Based on these models, 500 samples
of channel matrices were generated as described in Section 7.4 for each link. Due
to the structure of the antenna, a cluster model corresponding to only one physical
channel needs to be extracted since both antennas are co-located within the same
structure at both ends. A conventional 2 × 2 MIMO system on the other hand,
would have 4 separate physical channels since each antenna occupy a different point
in space. This is merely a coincidence due to the choice of antenna; a conventional
129
MIMO antenna arrangement can be generated by considering the 4 different spatial
channels from ray tracing. Antenna patterns corresponding to the 4 different modes
were applied as described in Section 7.4.1 and binned assuming 20 MHz bandwidth
to obtain the simulated channels for all the links.
7.5.3 Capacity Calculations
The channel matrix for the lth tap of each link is represented by a 2× 2 matrix Hl[r]
where r denotes time index. The elements of Hl[r] denoted by hijl(r) represents the
channel between receiver port i and transmitter port j at sample time r. It should
be noted that the measured channels correspond to an OFDM system conveying data
over K (= 52 in this study) subcarriers where each subcarrier is considered to be
flat over the duration of a single OFDM frame transmission. Therefore, for ease of
comparison, the simulated time domain channels were transformed to the frequency
domain as:
H [r, k] =
L−1∑
l=0
Hl [r] e
−j 2pilk
K (7.19)
where k represents the subcarrier index and L is the total number of channel taps
(= 6 in this study).
To remove the transmit power level differences in simulations and measurements
while preserving the relative antenna gains between the different antenna mode com-
binations a normalization was performed on all channel samples. For a given link,
the normalization was performed with respect to mode a on all time samples corre-
sponding to the remaining 3 mode combinations. The normalization factor is given
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by:
F =
√√√√( 1
KRNtNr
R∑
r=1
K∑
k=1
‖ Ha [r, k] ‖2F
)
where R represents the total number of simulated samples and ‖ Ha [r, k] ‖2F
denotes the Frobenius norm of the rth sample of the channel corresponding to mode
a and subcarrier k. F is computed separately for each simulated and measured link.
Finally, the mean ergodic channel capacity was calculated using [74]:
C =
1
K
K∑
k=1
log2
∣∣∣∣INr + ρNtH [n, k] HH [n, k]
∣∣∣∣ (7.20)
where ρ is the average SNR across all subcarriers and was fixed at 10dB in all
computations.
7.5.4 Results
The cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of the observed capacities from sim-
ulations and measurements for the 6 links are shown in Fig. 7.3. Some general
observations are made based on these plots. The first observation is that the change
of capacity trends with different antenna modes is clearly manifested in the simu-
lated results. Also, the relative performance trends between different modes also
changes based on the link locations, which is consistent with what is observed from
measurements.
Measured relative trends for each antenna configuration in links 1,2 and 5 show
complete agreement with the simulations. In all the links, the best and worst per-
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Figure 7.3: CDF of simulated channel capacities for the 6 analyzed links. Links
1, 2 and 5 show complete agreement in terms of the relative performances between
different modes. The two intermediate modes in links 4 and 6 have very similar
trends in simulations, but are separated due to scattering from moving users in
the measurements. Two modes are flipped in link 3 due to the lower fidelity of
the geometrical model in the physical region of interest.
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forming modes are clearly revealed. However, two intermediate combinations in links
4 and 6 are too similar in simulations to make a clear distinction between them in
terms of performance. However, these two modes have clear difference in the mea-
sured links. This can be attributed to the fact that these two links were in the area
of the atrium where there was relatively high level of movements. Though a very
close behavior is expected between the two modes from simulations, the scattering
effects of moving people tends to separate out these modes in reality. Nonetheless,
this does not affect the other links since the modes are predicted to be more separated
to begin with. Proposed extensions to mitigate this problem are discussed in Section
7.7. Two of the inner modes are flipped between the measured and simulated results
for link 3. The section of the environment through which rays corresponding to link
3 propagate contains a large staircase structure with large ornamental metallic and
glass railings and has the least fidelity in terms of the geometrical model used in
the simulations. Therefore the observed flips are attributed to some of the relatively
significant propagation effects that were not accounted for in the ray tracing simu-
lations. This observation also stresses the importance of a high fidelity geometrical
model required for this technique.
There is also a noticeable difference in the span of the simulated and measured
capacities. The simulated capacity values span a wider range compared to the mea-
sured capacities. It should be noted that the measurement time between two channel
samples is not explicitly specified in this model which results in samples that are
decorrelated in time. However, the measured channels were observed to be relatively
static and therefore the resulting capacities showed a smaller variation. The capacity
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differences are also partly due to the difficulty in matching the powers levels be-
tween simulations and measurements. It should be borne in mind that these factors
do not hinder the model from fulfilling its main objective of revealing the relative
performances of the different antenna modes.
With the preceding observations, it is concluded that this approach coupled with
an accurate geometrical model of the environment can be used to faithfully reveal the
relative performances of different antenna structures in a wireless system.
7.6 Application II: Authentication Metric Analysis
Next the authentication scheme described in Chapter 5 is studied using the developed
simulation method. Studying such a problem through simulations requires that dif-
ferent links be uniquely modeled based on the node locations such that the underlying
unique multi-path structure is effectively manifested in the resulting channels while
also accounting for realistic temporal variations. The only approach to simulate the
wireless channel for this purpose is reported in [10], which follows a similar hybrid
approach. Time variations were modeled as an autoregressive process that requires a
high sampling rate to track the channel in time which makes it challenging to match
the results with real time measurements since most SDR testbeds operate at much
lower sampling rates. Additionally, most work published on this subject assume the
use of an omni-directional antenna. Temporal variations in [10] are modeled indepen-
dent of the average channel, which does not extend well to the case when different
antenna modes are used since the temporal variations will be correlated between the
different patterns. Due to its ability to faithfully preserve the channel correlation
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between different antenna patterns, it is surmised that results from this modeling
approach will be able to better match measured results. Therefore, in this section
the simulated results of the channel based authentication technique will be compared
with measured results.
7.6.1 Results
Accurate simulation of a reconfigurable antenna based authentication scheme should
result in good agreement with the measured ROC curves. In classifier design prob-
lems, the performance of different classifiers are compared in terms of the difference
in the area under the respective ROC curves [155]. The same quantity is adopted to
quantify the agreement between the measured and simulated ROC curves. Table 7.4
shows the difference in the area under the ROC curve for different values of N . m
and n in m-n denote the legitimate and adversary link indices respectively. In the
case of N = 2 and 3, the maximum error observed among all
(
4
N
)
combinations is
listed. ROCs corresponding to the best and worst cases presented in the table are
shown in Fig. 7.4.
The maximum error observed for the RCPA is 11%. The mean error across all
links and mode combinations was found to be 2.4% with a standard deviation of
2.2% which can be considered to be within an acceptable range. It was also observed
that the simulated results usually overestimated the missed detection rate for a given
probability of false alarm. Therefore, actual performance can be expected to be
marginally better than that estimated by the simulations.
The acceptable levels of agreement are achieved due to the main strength of this
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Table 7.4: Differences in Area Under Simulated and Measured ROCs for the
RCPA
N 1-2 2-1 1-3 3-1 2-3 3-2
2 0.0994 0.1115 0.0361 0.0830 0.0303 0.0451
3 0.0463 0.0901 0.0226 0.0700 0.0173 0.0367
4 0.0108 0.0522 0.0344 0.0539 0.0098 0.0160
4-5 5-4 4-6 6-4 5-6 6-5
2 0.0148 0.0185 0.0029 0.0165 0.0060 0.0379
3 0.0006 0.0034 0.0196 0.0165 0.0075 0.0398
4 0.0264 0.0227 0.0686 0.0040 0.0290 0.0384
model. The choice of this test statistic requires the relative difference between the
channels corresponding to the different antenna modes be accurately revealed for
meaningful evaluation of the scheme through simulations. As demonstrated in Section
7.5, this model succeeds at achieving this. This same property also leads to a better
evaluation of the authentication scheme as well.
7.7 Conclusion
In summary, a wireless channel modeling technique was developed by fitting a cluster
channel model based on the results of ray tracing simulations that employ isotropic
antennas at individual links. Variations in different samples generated from the result-
ing model introduce temporal variations in the channel. Different antenna patterns
can be then applied to the samples and the resulting power delay profile is binned
based on a given receiver bandwidth. The approach was also extended to model
MIMO channels by considering the separate links corresponding to the different an-
136
10−2 10−1 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
False Alarm Rate
M
is
se
d 
De
te
ct
io
n 
Ra
te
 
 
4 − 5, N = 3, Combination 1 − Simulated
4 − 5, N = 3, Combination 1 − Measured
2 − 1, N = 2, Combination 2 − Simulated
2 − 1, N = 2, Combination 2 − Measured
Figure 7.4: ROC curves corresponding to the best and worst cases listed in Table
7.4.
tenna locations. The resulting model was used to simulate the wireless channel for
two applications and the results were compared to measured values which yielded
good agreement.
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Chapter 8: Magnetic Permeability Enhanced Metamaterial
Substrate
8.1 Introduction
This chapter describes how a magnetic permeability enhanced metamaterial can be
used to enhance the antenna array of a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) com-
munication system. The performance of a rectangular patch antenna array on a
metamaterial substrate was studied relative to a similar array constructed on a con-
ventional FR4 substrate. Differently spaced arrays were analytically compared us-
ing array correlation coefficients and mean effective gain as performance metrics.
Achievable channel capacities were obtained through channel measurements made on
a MIMO testbed. While results show that arrays on conventional FR4 substrates
have higher capacity due to gain and efficiency factors, arrays can be made smaller,
and have less mutual coupling and correlation coefficients, when using a metamaterial
substrate, but the antenna built on the metamaterial substrate can be made more
efficient through the use of better host materials. This was reflected in the analysis of
both antenna arrays normalized to remove efficiency and gain differences where they
showed similar performances. The results show that when antenna array miniaturiza-
tion is a key design criteria, the metamaterial substrate can be a more optimal choice
compared to conventional substrates that achieve the same miniaturization factor.
As it will be discussed in Chapter 9, the antenna size poses a major challenge
for reconfigurable antennas in modern wireless systems. The goal of this chapter in
138
the larger context of this thesis is therefore to the address the issue of reconfigurable
antenna miniaturization. While this work focuses on the benefits of employing a
metamaterial substrate for an antenna array, it will be made evident that the same
technique can be a cost-effective solution to address the problem of reconfigurable
antenna miniaturization as well. Hence the technology discussed in this chapter can
contribute towards overcoming one of the major hurdles for large scale adoption of
reconfigurable antennas and thus bring the security schemes based on such antennas
into reality.
8.2 Background
Wireless communication systems have become pervasive and ubiquitous to the point
where data rate and quality of service requirements have become comparable to
those of wired communication systems. Next generation wireless systems incorpo-
rate multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) techniques to achieve their performance
goals. MIMO systems promise higher channel capacities compared to single antenna
systems by exploiting the spatial characteristics of the multipath wireless propagation
channel [135]. The theoretical performance gain achievable by MIMO systems is lim-
ited due to a number of practical design factors, including the design of the antenna
array and the amount of inter-array element mutual coupling. While mutual coupling
can improve performance in certain environments by creating pattern diversity [130],
increased correlation between the received signals in other environments can degrade
performance [120, 156]. Though increasing the spacing between array elements can
alleviate mutual coupling, accommodating multiple antennas with large inter-element
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spacing in modern consumer devices may be impossible due to stringent space con-
straints. In order to meet such demanding, and often contradictory design criteria,
antenna designers have been constantly driven to seek better antenna designs and
materials on which to build antenna systems.
A plethora of antenna miniaturization techniques have been reported in literature.
Fractal antenna techniques have been extensively applied to miniaturize different
kind of wire antennas with reasonable outcomes [157]. Microstrip patch antenna
size reduction has been achieved through the use of high dielectric materials [158].
Changing the current path by introducing slots on the resonating surface has been
reported in [159]. Other constructions for reduced size patch antennas include multi-
layer patch antennas [160], planar inverted F antennas [161] and quarter-wave patches
[162]. Electromagnetic band-gap materials have been shown to significantly reduce
substrate thicknesses and are being actively applied for different antenna structures
[163]. A completely different approach to antenna miniaturization is the application
of genetic algorithms in antenna design and this had lead to interesting results [164].
Metamaterials are a broad class of synthetic materials that could be engineered
to wield permittivity and permeability characteristics to system requirements [165,
166]. By embedding specific structures (usually periodic structures) in some host
media (usually a dielectric substrate), the resulting material can be tailored to exhibit
desirable characteristics. These materials have drawn a lot of interest in the antenna
community due to their promising features. Metamaterials have been extensively
applied for antenna applications recently to achieve antenna miniaturization [167],
improved directivity [168], beam scanning [100] and beamwidth control [100].
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A novel application of metamaterials has been found in enhancing the magnetic
permeability of otherwise non-magnetic materials [169, 170]. It is well known that
antennas suffer from poor efficiency when their sizes go below λ/10 where λ is the op-
erating wavelength, a fact that has been a major impediment in using high dielectric
materials to miniaturize antennas. But magnetic permeability enhanced metamate-
rials can provide a more balanced solution to this problem since these materials can
miniaturize antennas by not only scaling down the wavelength with their permittivity,
but also with their high permeability, resulting in a significant size reduction while
operating at acceptable efficiencies.
In the following sections of this chapter, the performance of a miniaturized rectan-
gular patch antenna array built on a magnetic permeability enhanced metamaterial
substrate for a 2 × 2 MIMO communications system using spatial multiplexing will
be quantified through channel measurements. The channel measurements were per-
formed in different indoor propagation environments for different inter-element spac-
ings at a carrier frequency of 2.484 GHz. The measurements were repeated with a
similar antenna array built on a conventional FR4 substrate. Comparisons are made
between the two systems in terms of mean effective gain (MEG), envelope correlation
coefficients, measured channel capacities, and array physical footprint on a mobile
device.
8.3 Metamaterial Substrate Design
Inside a dielectric material, the free space wavelength of an antenna is scaled down by
a factor of
√
µrr, where r is the dielectric constant and µr is the relative magnetic
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permeability of the material. Thus the size of an antenna can be significantly reduced
by choosing a high r or high µr material. Though miniaturization can be achieved
using high r materials, it comes at the cost of increased dielectric losses that can
significantly affect antenna efficiency [158]. On the other hand, materials that exhibit
a high µr in the microwave region do not exist in nature and designers have been
compelled to use lossy high r materials when antenna miniaturization is a key design
requirement. Fortunately materials that exhibit high µr, or magnetic permeability
enhanced metamaterials, can now be artificially engineered to lead to smaller antennas
without compromising other design criteria [170].
Magnetic permeability enhanced metamaterials are constructed by stacking up
unit cells that can store magnetic energy by virtue of their structure. A unit cell for
the material used in this study contains an inductive spiral loop embedded in a host
dielectric material as shown in Fig. 8.1. Magnetic energy storage is created in the
unit cell when a magnetic field passes normal to the plane of the spiral, inducing a
current in the loop. This phenomenon effectively creates an inductance within the
host substrate material. The material is formed by stacking up these unit cells uni-
formly in three dimension. A resonance behavior is generated at frequencies dictated
by the inductance of the loop and capacitances that exist between adjacent arms in
the loop. Thus at resonance, a significant net magnetic energy storage is induced
within the 3D structure and thus the magnetic permeability of the otherwise non-
magnetic substrate material is enhanced. In order to realize a miniaturized antenna,
it is therefore necessary to match the resonance frequency of the material and the
antenna. The resonance frequency of this structure can be controlled by tuning the
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Figure 8.1: Structure of metamaterial unit cell containing spiral loop embedded
in a dielectric substrate (all units are in mm).
spiral and substrate dimensions.
The resonance frequency for the intended antenna design is 2.484 GHz. Therefore
the unit cell structure is designed to resonate at this frequency, consistent with the
antenna resonance frequency. The unit cell structure designed to resonate in the 2.484
GHz band is shown in Fig. 8.1 along with its dimensions. FR4 (r = 4.4, µr = 1, loss
tangent tanδ = 0.02) was chosen as the host material for the metamaterial substrate.
Initial simulations of the unit cell and the stacked 3D structure were carried out
using the finite element method software HFSS [119]. Bulk material properties of
this substrate were extracted from the simulated S parameters as described in [171].
The extracted r and µr values around the 2.484 GHz band is shown in Fig. 8.2(a).
The effective µr was found to be approximately 4.2 in the direction perpendicular
to the plane of the unit cell. This substrate also experiences an enhancement in
permittivity due its geometry [170]. The extracted effective r was 9.7. The resulting
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electric and magnetic tan δ values are plotted in Fig. 8.2(b) The resulting electric
and magnetic tan δ are 0.2 and 0.05 respectively at the design frequency. These
values imply a lossy substrate leading to poor antenna efficiencies. This problem and
possible ways to improve antenna performance are discussed in Section 8.4.3.
The unit cells were fabricated using the T-Tech QC5000 milling machine. Unit
cells belonging to the same plane in the 3D structure were milled together on a single
FR4 block and these blocks were held together using tiny plastic screws at either ends
of the blocks. The misalignment caused by the unit cells was limited to 0.1 mm which
corresponds to the tolerance of the milling machine. The antenna and ground plane
were cut out from a 0.07 mm thick copper sheet using the milling machine and was
affixed to the substrate using a thin coating of polymer based industrial adhesive.
8.4 Antenna Design
The antenna geometry used in this study is a rectangular patch antenna with a
recessed microstrip feed line [77], backed by a ground plane and operating in the
TM010 mode built on the metamaterial substrate. Current is induced in the spiral
loop only by magnetic fields oriented in a direction perpendicular to the plane of the
spiral. Hence magnetic permeability enhancement is unidirectional in the substrate.
Since the magnetic field in the near field of a rectangular patch antenna would be in
a direction perpendicular to its radiating edge, this antenna design can fully utilize
the available permeability in this direction..
The structural detail of an antenna element build on the 3D metamaterial sub-
strate and a built prototype are shown in Fig. 8.3. A picture of the antenna array
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Figure 8.2: Effective material parameters around the resonance frequency of
2.484 GHz from HFSS simulations. (a) Effective permittivity (r) and permeabil-
ity (µr) (b) Electrical and magnetic loss tangents (tan δ)
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Table 8.1: Substrate and Antenna Dimensions
Dimension (mm) Metamaterial FR4
L 18 45
W 10 40
l 9 33
w 9 29
y0 3 6
W0 2 5
t 8 1.27
mounted on the testbed used for channel measurements is shown in Fig. 8.4. The
relevant substrate and antenna dimensions are shown in Table 8.1. Dimensions are
also shown in Table 8.1 for a similar antenna built on a regular FR4 substrate that
was used as a reference to compare the performance of this metamaterial-substrate
antenna. The designed metamaterial-substrate antenna achieved a miniaturization
factor of approximately 3 in the radiation edge length compared to a rectangular
patch antenna operating at the same frequency built on a conventional FR4 sub-
strate. Also, a significant 90% reduction in the area occupied by the antenna plane
was achieved. However, due to the higher thickness of the metamaterial substrate,
the entire volume for a single antenna on a metamaterial substrate was approximately
37% less than that of a conventional FR4 substrate.
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Figure 8.3: (a) Schematic of the rectangular patch antenna built on the mag-
netic permeability enhanced metamaterial substrate. The dimensions are listed
in Table 8.1. (b) Fabricated metamaterial-substrate antenna structure.
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Figure 8.4: View of the metamaterial-substrate antenna array mounted on the
HYDRA testbed during channel measurements.
8.4.1 Bandwidth and Gain
Figure 8.5 shows the return loss characteristics of the designed antenna. The -10 dB
bandwidth of this antenna is approximately 50 MHz. This bandwidth is comparable
to that of an antenna built on a conventional FR4 substrate.
Figure 8.6 shows the measured gain of the metamaterial and FR4 antennas in
the elevation and azimuth planes. The conventional FR4 substrate antenna has 6
dB more gain than the metamaterial-substrate antenna in the elevation plane and
approximately 2 dB more gain in the azimuth plane. Although the difference in gain
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Figure 8.5: Return loss characteristics for the metamaterial and FR4 substrate
antennas.
is significant in the elevation plane, the primary contribution to the difference in
communication system performance between the two antennas would be due to gain
differences in the azimuth plane [172]. These gain differences between the antennas
can be attributed to two factors.
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Figure 8.6: Measured gain in the (a) elevation plane (φ = 0o) and (b) azimuth
plane (θ = 90o) for metamaterial and FR4 substrate antennas. The spacing
between the antenna elements is 60 mm (λ/2).
The primary reason for the gain differences is the lower efficiency of the metamaterial-
substrate antenna as discussed in the next section. Secondly, the metamaterial-
substrate antenna has a much smaller ground plane compared to the conventional
FR4 substrate antenna which leads to more fringing effects and a reduction in direc-
tivity in the elevation plane as seen in 8.6(a). To study the effect of substrate size, the
metamaterial-substrate antenna was constructed on a larger metamaterial substrate
with the substrate length and width equal to that of the FR4 antenna substrate. The
antenna is shown in Fig. 8.7(a). Therefore the ground plane for this antenna was
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equal in size to that of the FR4 antenna. The measured radiation pattern in the ele-
vation plane for this antenna shown in Fig. 8.7(b) shows that the peak gain in the this
plane for this metamaterial-substrate antenna was around -2 dBi. This corresponds
to a 3 dB gain improvement compared to that of the original metamaterial-substrate
antenna design with a smaller substrate. The large back-lobe that was present in
the original metamaterial-substrate antenna as seen in Fig. 8.6(a) was significantly
suppressed in this design. The measured azimuthal gain did not show any significant
differences in gain values between the two antennas with different substrate sizes.
(b)(a)
Figure 8.7: (a) Antenna constructed on a larger metamaterial substrate in order
to study the effect of having a large ground plane (b) Elevation and azimuth
radiation patterns of the antenna with the larger ground plane.
It is important that the azimuth gain does not deteriorate within the usage band-
width as the azimuth plane gain has a more significant effect on capacity performance
since multipath signal propagation in indoor environments (such as the ones used for
channel measurements in this study) happens mostly in this plane [172]. Table 8.2
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Table 8.2: Peak Gains at Different Frequencies Around 2.484 GHz in the Ele-
vation and Azimuthal Planes
Frequency (GHz) Peak Elevation Gain [dBi] Peak Azimuth Gain [dBi]
2.464 -4.5 -3.0
2.476 -5.6 -3.5
2.496 -4.5 -2.5
2.504 -4.2 -2.2
lists the peak gain in the elevation and azimuth planes for frequencies around 2.484
GHz at which the channel measurements were performed. As seen in the table, the
designed antenna’s gain characteristics do not deteriorate in this frequency region.
The performance dependance on the azimuthal gain pattern also justifies the sacrifice
made in the elevation plane gain due to a smaller ground plane in order to achieve a
smaller antenna footprint.
8.4.2 Cross-polarization Discrimination
Cross-polarization discrimination (XPD) quantifies the degree of the sense of polar-
ization of a linearly polarized antenna. The XPD of an antenna is given by:
XPD =
∫ 2pi
0
∫ pi/2
−pi/2Gθ(θ, φ)cosθdθdφ∫ 2pi
0
∫ pi/2
−pi/2Gφ(θ, φ)cosθdθdφ
(8.1)
where Gθ(θ, φ) and Gφ(θ, φ) are the θ and φ components of the antenna gain pattern.
The computed XPD values for the metamaterial substrate and FR4 antennas are
given in Table 8.3 when the antennas are placed at different spacings in an array.
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Table 8.3: XPD for Different Antenna Array Configurations
Antenna Configuration XPD [dB]
Metamaterial-Substrate Antenna at 0.05λ 7.8
Metamaterial-Substrate Antenna at 0.5λ 4.2
FR4 Antenna at 0.05λ 7.3
FR4 Antenna at 0.5λ 2.7
The antennas are linearly polarized as expected of a rectangular microstrip patch
antenna and XPD decreases with inter-element spacing for both antenna types. As
seen from the table, less polarization distortion occurs due to the presence of the other
antenna elements in the array for the metamaterial-substrate antenna compared to
the FR4 antenna. This can be explained by the unidirectional substrate enhancement
that ’suppress’ the cross-polar fields generated in the substrate, resulting in less cross-
polararization coupling.
8.4.3 Efficiency
The measured efficiency for the metamaterial-substrate antenna and FR4 antenna
were 30% and 48% respectively. In addition to the losses due to surface waves excited
in the substrate, which contributes to losses in both antennas, the current induced in
the inductive loop in each unit cell contributes to ohmic losses in the metamaterial
substrate. Additionally, the capacitive losses in the metamaterial host medium is also
increased due to the increased thickness of the stacked substrate structure. The elec-
tric and magnetic tan δ determined in Section 8.3 demonstrate these results. While,
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Figure 8.8: Predicted radiation efficiency of the metamaterial-substrate antenna
for different host substrate tan δ with r = 4.4.
at first look, this difference in efficiency may discourage the use of a metamaterial
substrate, this difference should be viewed in light of several other factors. Figure 8.8
shows the simulated efficiencies obtainable with the metamaterial-substrate antenna
for different tan δ with the other host material properties being the same as that of
FR4. It can be seen that the problem of lower efficiency is mainly due to the lossy
nature of the FR4 substrate. Therefore the problem of efficiency can be addressed by
choosing a low loss host material.
Also a simple calculation based on the miniaturization factor described in a pre-
ceding paragraph reveals that it requires a conventional substrate with an r value
of 45 to achieve the miniaturization factor achieved by the metamaterial substrate.
There a two reasons for why a metamaterial substrate would be a better choice than
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a material with such a high r. The theoretical maximum efficiency achievable by
a microstrip patch antenna decreases significantly with r due to the high dielectric
losses incurred in such a material. The maximum efficiency predicted by [158] for an
antenna built on a material with an r of 45 and tan δ of 0.0001 would be around 35%
which is similar to that of the efficiency achieved by the metamaterial substrate build
on FR4 as the host substrate. As predicted by Fig. 8.8, a more efficient antenna
can be realized by building the substrate on a lower r but less lossy host material.
The second reason is that low loss, high r materials can be prohibitively expen-
sive since they are usually composites made of different materials. Cheaper polymer
based alternatives have much higher dielectric losses compared to the metamaterial
substrate (tan δ > 0.02) leading to efficiencies on the order of 5 - 15 % [158]. Hence,
when miniaturization is a key design requirement, the metamaterial substrate is an
efficient and cost-effective solution.
8.5 Analysis of Correlation Characteristics
The signal correlation at the receiver is an important factor that affects the operation
of a MIMO system. Mutual coupling between the antenna elements as well as the
radio propagation environment contribute to signal correlation. In this section signal
correlation is quantified using two metrics: mutual coupling between the antenna
elements and the correlation coefficient.
Higher mutual coupling between the antenna elements in a MIMO system leads to
higher correlation between the received signals and thus lower system performance.
For arrays on both substrates considered in this study, the mutual coupling between
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array elements was analyzed in terms of the isolation (S21) between them. Isolation
between the antenna elements was measured using a vector network analyzer in free
space with the antennas mounted on the testbed as shown in Fig. 8.4. The measured
isolations for the metamaterial-substrate antenna array and the conventional FR4
antenna array are shown in Fig. 8.9. The result shows a difference of 15 dB in isolation
between the metamaterial and FR4 antenna arrays at very low inter element spacing.
This difference drops to around 10 dB for higher spacing. This trend implies that the
received signals will be significantly less correlated for the metamaterial-substrate
antenna compared to the FR4 antenna for a given spacing. Another interesting
observation is that the isolation does not vary as much with inter-element spacing
for the metamaterial-substrate antenna; the difference in isolation between λ/20 and
7λ/10 is 10 dB whereas the isolation varies by 16 dB for the FR4 antennas.
Correlation coefficient between the receiving antenna elements in a given environ-
ment takes into account both the antenna’s radiation pattern as well as the power
angular spectrum (PAS) of the environment and is thus an effective parameter to
characterize the degree of signal degradation due to antenna and environmental cor-
relation effects. The correlation coefficient between the antenna elements in a MIMO
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Figure 8.9: Measured mutual coupling between the antenna elements for differ-
ent antenna spacing for the metamaterial and FR4 substrate antenna arrays.
array is given by [173]:
ρe =
[∣∣∫ {XPR.Eθ1(θ, φ)E∗θ2(θ, φ)Pθ(θ, φ) + Eφ1(θ, φ)E∗φ2(θ, φ)Pφ(θ, φ)} exp−jβx dφdθ∣∣2]
∫ {XPR.Eθ1(θ, φ)E∗θ1(θ, φ)Pθ(θ, φ) + Eφ1(θ, φ)E∗φ1(θ, φ)Pφ(θ, φ)}dφdθ
× ∫ {XPR.Eθ2(θ, φ)E∗θ2(θ, φ)Pθ(θ, φ) + Eφ2(θ, φ)E∗φ2(θ, φ)Pφ(θ, φ)}dφdθ

(8.2)
where XPR is the cross polarization power ratio, Pθ(θ, φ) and Pφ(θ, φ) are the θ and
φ components of the PAS of the incident waves and Eθk(θ, φ), Eφk(θ, φ) are the θ and
φ components of the kth antenna’s complex electric field envelopes, x is the distance
between the two antenna elements and β is the wave number.
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The propagation environment is specified by the PAS of the vertically and hori-
zontally polarized incident radio waves. The power angular spectrum of the vertically
and horizontally polarized received signals are assumed to be distributed uniformly
in azimuth and distributed as a Gaussian function in elevation which is consistent
with the measured results reported in [153] for an indoor environment. Therefore the
distributions corresponding to PAS are given by :
Pθ(θ, φ) = Aθ exp
[
−(θ − θv)
2
2σ2v
]
, θ ∈
[
−pi
2
,
pi
2
]
(8.3)
Pφ(θ, φ) = Aφ exp
[
−(θ − θh)
2
2σ2h
]
, θ ∈
[
−pi
2
,
pi
2
]
(8.4)
where Aθ and Aφ are constants that satisfy the condition that the area under both the
curves sum to 1, θv and θh are the means and σv and σh are the standard deviations
of the θ and φ polarized components respectively. The correlation coefficients for the
two antenna array under different element spacings in an environment characterized
by the following parameters are listed in Table 8.4: mV = mV = 3
o, σV = σH = 10
o
and XPR = 7 dB. The choice of these values was based on the measurement results
reported for an indoor picocell in [153]. The closely spaced FR4 antennas experience
higher correlation than the metamaterial-substrate antennas. The FR4 antenna is
heavily correlated at closer spacings and correlation improvement is significant with
increased spacing, whereas the metamaterial-substrate antenna is reasonably uncorre-
lated even at closer inter-element spacings. Thus, as a result of the high inter-element
isolation between the elements, the metamaterial antenna array remains significantly
less correlated at closer inter-element spacings in a typical indoor propagation envi-
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Table 8.4: Correlation Coefficients
Antenna Type λ/20 spacing λ/2 spacing
Metamaterial Substrate 0.22 0.01
FR4 0.79 0.04
ronment such as the one described here.
8.6 Mean Effective Gain Analysis
Though antenna gain is a good measure for an antenna’s performance in a stationary
wireless communication system, it does not give complete information to the sys-
tem designer on how well the antenna will perform in a mobile system due to the
randomness of the multipaths. The mean effective gain (MEG) of an antenna has
been used as a possible measure to evaluate an antenna’s performance in such mobile
wireless channels [174]. MEG of an antenna is evaluated by considering the mean
received signal power by the test antenna and a reference antenna while they traverse
a random route which is representative of the environment for which the MEG is
considered to be valid. MEG is significantly affected by the antenna’s gain pattern
and the radio propagation environment. In this section the MEG of the metamaterial
substrate array is analytically evaluated and compared with the FR4 substrate array
for different propagation scenarios.
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The following analytical expression for MEG is used in this analysis [174]:
MEG =
∫ 2pi
0
∫ pi
0
[
XPR
1 +XPR
Gθ(θ, φ)Pθ(θ, φ) +
1
1 +XPR
Gφ(θ, φ)Pφ(θ, φ)
]
sinθdθdφ
(8.5)
Figure 8.10 shows the MEG of the metamaterial-substrate antenna referenced to
the FR4 antenna’s MEG. The same values for mH , mV , σV and σH were assumed as
in the previous section. As one would expect, due to the significant gain differences
between the antennas, the metamaterial-substrate antenna does not outperform the
FR4 antenna in any XPR region. However some interesting observations can be
made from this figure. The MEG of the λ/20 spaced metamaterial-substrate antenna
w.r.t. the λ/20 spaced FR4 antenna is close to -2 dB. This difference is less than
the measured peak gain differences seen in Fig. 8.6. In other words, the difference in
gain becomes narrower when the antennas are operated in a mobile scenario similar
to the one considered for the MEG calculations. Secondly, the MEG for the λ/2
spaced metamaterial-substrate antenna w.r.t. it’s FR4 counterpart decreases to -3 dB.
However this difference in MEG is still less than the measured peak gain differences.
The preceding two observations can be explained by the correlation coefficients of the
antennas shown in Table 8.4 where the closely spaced FR4 antennas suffer from high
correlation compared to the metamaterial-substrate antenna.
Another observation is that there is an improvement in MEG as the cross over
to positive XPR region occurs for both spacings. This MEG improvement can be
explained by the higher XPD values for the metamaterial-substrate antenna shown
in Table 8.3. In the positive XPR region, most of the incident power is vertically
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Figure 8.10: MEG variation for the metamaterial-substrate antenna with XPR.
The MEG values are referenced to the FR4 substrate antenna.
polarized and proportionally, the metamaterial-substrate antenna can better capture
this power than the FR4 antenna resulting in an increase in MEG.
8.7 Channel Measurements and Results
The performance of the designed metamaterial-substrate antenna array as well as
the FR4 array was evaluated in terms of achievable channel capacity by taking mea-
surements on a 2 × 2 MIMO testbed. The measurements were performed in two
different indoor environments. One was a medium sized laboratory (test environment
1). The laboratory is 20 m long, 8 m wide and 4 m high. The lab has several cubicles
segmented by metallic walls and has other typical laboratory furniture, electronic
equipment, and cabling scattered throughout the room. A single transmitter location
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was chosen. Channel measurements were performed for 6 receiver locations. The
second environment was a medium sized atrium situated inside the Bossone research
building on Drexel University campus (test environment 2). This space is enclosed
by a combination of walls and metallic doors, with the space within the atrium being
practically empty. Channel measurements were performed for 5 receiver locations.
The CAD layout of both the environments are shown in Fig. 8.11. The transmit-
ter locations are denoted by a ‘TX’ and the receiver positions by the corresponding
number in the layout diagrams. Receiver locations were chosen so that there were a
combination of both LOS and NLOS links in both environments. For all the trans-
mitter and receiver positions in both the environments, the antennas were mounted
at a height of 1.5m.
Measurements were taken with two nodes of the HYDRA testbed [175] which is
described in detail in Appendix D.
The communication channel is assumed to be a flat fading MIMO communication
channel, described by the following equation:
y = Hx + n (8.6)
where x is the NT x 1 transmitted signal vector, y is the NR x 1 received signal vector,
H is the NR x NT channel transfer matrix, NR and NT are the number of receivers
and transmitters respectively and n denotes additive white Gaussian noise.
Measurements were performed for 6 different array configurations: metamaterial-
substrate antenna array with inter-element spacing of λ/20, λ/10 and λ/2 and the
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Figure 8.11: 2D CAD model of indoor (a) Test environment I. The number
in the brackets indicate the height of the antennas at the particular location.
The NLOS links are due to the 2.5m partition walls which are higher than the
height at which the antennas were mounted. (b) Test environment II showing the
transmitter and receiver locations and the antenna array orientation.
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same spacing repeated with the FR4 antenna array for test environment I and 4 dif-
ferent array configurations: metamaterial-substrate antenna array with inter-element
spacing of λ/10 and λ/2 and the same spacing repeated with the FR4 antenna array
for test environment II. The H matrices obtained for each link were normalized with
respect to the corresponding λ/2 spaced FR4 antenna array configuration in order to
remove the difference in path losses among the different array configurations. This
Frobenius normalization factor is defined as [120]:
NF =
√
‖H(0.5λ),(FR4)‖2
NRNT
(8.7)
The channel capacity for each array configuration was computed using the nor-
malized matrices as follows [176]:
C =
1
Nch
Nch∑
i=1
log2
[
det
(
INR +
SNR
NT
HiH
†
i
)]
(8.8)
where INR is the NR x NR identity matrix, SNR is the signal to noise ratio. Nch = 200
is the number of channel realizations measured at each receiver position, Hi is the
normalized channel matrix corresponding to the ith channel realization and † denotes
the complex conjugate transpose operation.
The average capacities achieved as a function of signal to noise ratio over multiple
channel realizations and different links for the 6 different array configurations at the
edge frequency of 2.474 GHz for test environment I are shown in Fig. 8.12. Due to
their much higher gain, the FR4 substrate antennas outperform the metamaterial-
164
substrate antenna. However, it is important to note that the performance of the
metamaterial-substrate antenna is relatively unchanged with different inter-element
spacing. The λ/2 spaced metamaterial-substrate antenna array shows only a 0.4
bits/Hz/sec maximum improvement over its λ/20 spaced array whereas the λ/2
spaced FR4 array shows a 2 bits/Hz/sec improvement. This unchanging capacity
can be explained by looking at Fig. 8.9 and Table 8.4 where mutual coupling and the
correlation coefficients vary comparatively little with increasing inter-element spacing
for the metamaterial array. For a given throughput requirement, this significant result
makes the metamaterial-substrate antenna a highly suitable candidate for a MIMO
system because it can be spaced very closely together without sacrificing performance.
This close spacing reinforces the already small structure of the metamaterial-substrate
antenna, leading to a significant reduction in antenna footprint in the system.
Similar capacity results for test environment II at the same frequency is shown in
Fig. 8.13. Again the same trends are present. The difference in capacity performance
remains within a very close margin between the λ/10 and λ/2 spaced metamaterial-
substrate antenna arrays.
Figure 8.14 shows the capacities achieved by the metamaterial-substrate antenna
array at the different sub-carrier frequencies of the OFDM system at 10 dB SNR.
The frequency span of the OFDM system is 20 MHz centered around 2.484 GHz. As
it can be seen, the capacity is a function of frequency. This can be attributed to
the small scale propagation effects at different frequencies combined with the subtle
gain differences within this band as listed in Table 8.2. Yet the figure shows that the
achievable capacity does approximately vary about a mean line within the 20 MHz
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Figure 8.12: Test environment I: Average channel capacity as a function of SNR
for the metamaterial and FR4 substrate antenna arrays for different inter-element
spacing.
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Figure 8.13: Test environment II: Average channel capacity as a function of
SNR for the metamaterial and FR4 substrate antenna arrays for different inter-
element spacing.
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frequency range.
Finally, to compare the two antenna substrates with normalizations to remove rela-
tive gain and efficiency effects, a cumulative distribution function (cdf) was assembled
using the capacities computed for all links and all sub-carriers in test environment 1.
The channel matrices for each antenna array configuration had its own normalization
factor. The Frobenius normalization factor in this case is defined as:
NF,Configuration,Frequency =
√
‖HConfiguration,Frequency‖2
NRNT
(8.9)
The cdf results are shown in Fig. 8.15 for a SNR of 10 dB. For a given inter-element
spacing, it can be seen that the two arrays show similar performance. For any given
outage probability, the metamaterial-substrate antenna array either outperforms the
FR4 array or lies within a 1 bit/Hz/sec difference. These results confirm the fact that
the performance gap between metamaterial and FR4 substrates in Fig. 8.12 can be
attributed to gain and efficiency factors.
8.8 Conclusion
The correlation characteristics, mean effective gain and capacity of a 2 × 2 MIMO
communication system that employed a metamaterial-substrate antenna array were
compared to that of a system that employed patch antennas built on a conventional
FR4 substrate. The metamaterial-substrate antenna array showed significantly less
correlation between its elements in a typical indoor environment scenario for different
inter-element spacings. This result also manifested itself in the measured channel
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capacities in 2 different indoor environments where the capacity improvement did
not change significantly with increasing inter-element spacing. Although the gain
values were significantly higher for the reference FR4 antenna, the difference in an-
alytical mean effective gain was significantly reduced due to the better polarization
discrimination properties of the metamaterial substrate. When normalized for gain
and efficiency effects, the metamaterial-substrate antenna array showed very similar
capacity gains to those of the FR4 array. Analysis also showed that the efficiency
of the metamaterial-substrate antenna can be improved with better choices for the
host dielectric material. This makes the metamaterial substrate a very cost-effective
solution to miniaturize antennas in future communication systems.
The results show that the designed metamaterial-substrate antenna array is a
good candidate for space constrained MIMO systems. With further improvements
to its efficiency and gain, a metamaterial-substrate antenna array could become an
ideal candidate for future MIMO systems as well as physically large reconfigurable
antenna structures.
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Chapter 9: Conclusion
Wireless security is a major focus point in modern network infrastructure design as
organizations increasingly deploy wireless networks that provide a means of accessing
critical and confidential data through an inherently insecure medium. Private users
are also facing more risks than ever before as they exchange more and more sensitive
information over home and public networks through their ubiquitous wireless-enabled
laptops and hand held devices. Still in its infant stages, wireless channel based secu-
rity techniques that exploit the characteristics of the wireless medium have begun to
emerge as a solution to address many of the current vulnerabilities that pose these
security challenges. However most wireless systems are constrained in terms of band-
width, power and number of antenna ports which seriously limit any such channel
based security implementations.
This thesis introduced a new dimension to the channel based security approach
by utilizing the capabilities of reconfigurable antennas. Reconfigurable antennas have
been shown to be great enhancers of spectral efficiency, though their inclusion in
wireless devices has been mainly hindered by their design complexity, cost and size.
By exploiting these antennas for security purposes, system designers can now over-
come the regulatory constraints that limit the performance of channel based security
schemes with single and multi-antenna systems while adding a lot more value for re-
configurable antennas which should serve as a catalyst to their widespread adoption.
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Two different schemes that make use of the channels generated by a reconfigurable
antenna were proposed and evaluated through measurements. For a given false alarm
rate, the reconfigurable antenna based intrusion detection schemes showed that the
rate of detection can be significantly improved with increasing number of antenna
modes used in the decision vector. Analysis of detector performance as a function
of pattern correlation coefficient also revealed that lower correlation between the
patterns lead to improved performance. The proposed schemes with a judicious choice
of modes can provide a level of security hitherto absent in unprotected public networks
while adding an additional layer of security to thwart intruders in other networks.
In order to facilitate the analysis of such schemes without resorting to comprehen-
sive channel measurements, a novel channel modeling approach was also developed.
This approach blends the cluster channel model and site specific ray tracer results
and can be used to generate channels to study systems that use reconfigurable an-
tennas for any application. Finally a metamaterial based substrate that can help
miniaturize antenna arrays and reconfigurable antennas was designed and evaluated
in this holistic study. The magnetic permeability enhanced metamaterial is capable
of miniaturizing an antenna’s footprint while also maintaining an acceptable level of
isolation between the elements when used in an array arrangement.
9.1 System Level Perspectives
The multi-disciplinary aspects of this work as well the as the seemingly conflicting
goals between throughput and security warrants a system level discussion before con-
cluding this thesis.
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Reconfigurable antennas outperform conventional antennas due to their ability to
generate different channel realizations, a capability that is traditionally exploited to
increase data rates or improve link reliability. Hence the primary justification for
incorporating such antenna systems in wireless systems is their ability to improve
spectral efficiency. The reconfigurable antenna design aspects of this thesis bore
proof to such benefits. However there are two major challenges faced by reconfigurable
antenna technology that has hindered its widespread adoption in commercial systems:
their large footprint and cost. A brief discussion on how the contributions of this thesis
help address these issues follows:
Reconfigurable Antenna Footprint
One of the major challenges posed by reconfigurable antennas is their large footprint
which makes it challenging to incorporate them in increasingly space starved com-
mercial devices such as wireless access points, laptops, PDAs as well as handheld
military equipment. The magnetic permeability enhanced metamaterial substrate is
a viable candidate for addressing this problem. Though the work presented in this
thesis focused on miniaturizing a conventional patch antenna and array, the same
metamaterial can be used to miniaturize antennas such as the the leaky wave an-
tenna used in this study. By applying the magnetic permeability enhanced substrate
(Fig. 9.1), the physical length of the transmission line can be decreased significantly
and the efficiency of the antenna can be improved due to the better balance between
electrical and magnetic energy storage induced in the structure.
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Figure 9.1: A possible design for a miniaturized CRLH transmission line leaky
wave antenna built on the magnetic permeability enhanced metamaterial sub-
strate.
Cost
The complexity associated with reconfigurable antennas leads to higher costs in in-
tegrating them into commercial systems. Such costs cannot be completely offset by
large scales of production which presents a significant challenge to their large scale
commercial adoption. However, if one can add additional value to these complex
antenna systems, such costs may be justified in commercially driven systems. As
discussed earlier, part of the motivation for this thesis is the value addition to the re-
configurable antenna due to its benefits in terms of security. Hence the antenna based
security schemes address the cost challenges associated with reconfigurable antennas
in an indirect manner.
Another system level issue that effects security schemes based on reconfigurable
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antennas is the effect they have on system throughput due to the frequent channel
estimates that needs to be obtained over multiple configurations. A brief discussion on
the trade-offs between system throughput and security is provided in the proceeding
section.
Impact on Data Rate
In order to optimally use reconfigurable antennas in terms of maximizing data through-
put or security, it is necessary to have continual knowledge of the channel response
between the transmitter and the receiver for each antenna configuration. However,
estimating the channel response for each antenna configuration will be power and
time consuming and will have a detrimental effect on the performance of the system
in terms of data rate. To overcome this problem, researchers have proposed several
antenna configuration selection algorithms that attempt to pick a sub-optimal an-
tenna configuration that yields a performance that is still significantly higher than
what can be provided by a non-reconfigurable antenna, but lower than the optimal
one that can be provided by the reconfigurable antenna system [177, 178]. This prob-
lem has different implications when the reconfigurable antenna is utilized to enhance
security in the system.
One possible scenario would be that the primary objective of the reconfigurable
antenna is to enhance the data throughput of the wireless system. In this case,
depending on the selection algorithm that is employed, channel information corre-
sponding to only a limited number of configurations will be available at the wireless
nodes at limited time intervals. This in turn will affect the performance of the chan-
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nel based security scheme. However, it should be observed that, similar to the data
throughput problem, the efficacy of the security scheme in such a scenario will still be
sub-optimal and will be significantly better than a non-reconfigurable antenna case.
The second scenario is where the primary objective of the reconfigurable antenna
system would be to strengthen the security of the wireless system. In this case it
would be imperative that the channel information be acquired frequently over many
different configurations. This will inevitably lead to some performance degradation
in terms of throughput. However this degradation in throughput may be partly or
completely offset by the gains that can be made by picking the best configuration.
Therefore it is likely that the system will be still performing above the performance
levels achievable with a non-reconfigurable antenna.
Therefore the joint, but different level of benefits that can be gained both in data
throughput and security in different environments will serve as a major luring factor
for incorporation of reconfigurable antennas in a commercial wireless system.
9.2 Potential Applications
The technical outcomes of this thesis have practical feasibility in a variety of appli-
cations:
• A significant level of protection can be enabled for a handheld device such as
a laptop operating in unprotected public hotspots such as coffee shops and air-
ports. By equipping the device with a reconfigurable antenna and the proposed
security schemes, it can make sure that it communicates with the legitimate
access point with which it established the original connection. The metamate-
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rial based substrate can reduce the footprint of the reconfigurable antenna for
incorporation in the handheld device.
• In organizations with comprehensive 802.11x based authentication services, ac-
cess points deployed with antenna based security features can ensure that only
the originally authenticated users continue to access the organizational network
infrastructure. This alleviates spoofing, hijacking and man-in-the-middle at-
tack threats from entities located outside or sometimes inside the organizations
premises.
• Stationary military radio systems that are deployed in hostile environments can
significantly benefit from such schemes as well.
9.3 Future Directions
This thesis has merely shown a glimpse of the great promises that reconfigurable
antennas have in store for enhancing channel based security schemes. However there
are many issues that need to addressed, and avenues that can be explored in the quest
to bring this technology into large scale commercial fruition which provides enormous
prospects for more exciting research in this area. Some of the key research areas are
briefly discussed below:
Machine Learning: The two techniques developed in this thesis are inspired by
a subset among a large class of pattern classification techniques found in the field
of machine learning [179]. Other methods such as neural networks, support vector
machines, and component analysis have been applied to intrusion detection in conven-
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tional data networks [180–182]. Significant research opportunities exist for applying
such methods for channel based intrusion detection in wireless systems as well.
Fingerprints: The performance of a fingerprint based intrusion scheme is only as
good as the fingerprint itself. Though a reconfigurable antenna provides a rich statisti-
cal description of the underlying physical link, most of the currently used fingerprints
exhibit large variance in time that hinders performance. The fields of machine learning
[152] and higher order statistical signal processing [183] have yielded effective feature
extraction techniques for a variety of other applications [184]. Such techniques can
be applied for forming more efficient fingerprints for channel based security schemes
as well. Moreover reconfigurable antennas with beam scanning capabilities along
with appropriate signal processing can provide information in the spatial domain for
effective intrusion detection.
Protocols for Channel Validation: The schemes proposed in this thesis assumed
the availability of reliable channel responses at the onset of communications as well as
periodic intervals. This may not always be possible in practice since the intruder may
try to launch an attack during the training period itself. Moreover, if a spoofed packet
passes the detection test and the last channel estimate is now used for future detection,
it can lead to an error propagation effect leading to all subsequent packets from the
legitimate transmitter being rejected. Similarly any major changes in the channel
can trigger many false alarms as well. Hence research on the design of protocols to
validate the channel in conjunction with higher level authentication mechanisms is
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imperative to the success of any channel based authentication scheme and significant
research needs to be carried out in this area to advance the technology.
Reconfigurable Antenna Design: As established in this thesis, a reconfigurable
antenna capable of generating a large number of decorrelated modes is best suited for
the security application. Therefore channel based security schemes can vastly benefit
from novel, compact and efficient reconfigurable antenna designs capable of exploit-
ing both the pattern and polarization diversity modes to generate highly decorrelated
channel realizations. For example the antenna shown in Fig. 9.1 can combine the
CRLH leaky wave antenna utilized in this thesis and the magnetic permeability en-
hanced metamaterial to arrive at a very compact reconfigurable antenna that has the
ability for continuous reconfiguration while producing different directional beams.
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Appendix A: Polarization Decomposition
We start with (7.4), which relates the net ray to its H and V polarized components:
βejϕrc = βV ejϕ
V
rc + βHejϕ
H
rc (A.1)
The suffix rc is dropped for notational convenience. When an isotropic antenna
with equal gains in both polarizations is employed, each polarization component in
every ray will be made up from two contributions.
1. Contribution from the co-polar transmission
2. Contribution from cross-polar transmission due to channel depolarization effects
The two components can be written as follows:
βHejϕ
H
= βH→Hejϕ1 + βV→Hejϕ2 (A.2)
βV ejϕ
V
= βV→V ejϕ3 + βH→V ejϕ4 (A.3)
Here i → j specifies that the energy transmitted in polarization i is received in
polarization j.
Based on the definitions of XPAR and CPAR, we can draw the random variables
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RX1 and RX2 from fc(RX) and RC1 from fc(RC) such that:
RC1 =
βH→H
βV→V
(A.4)
RX1 =
βV→H
βV→V
(A.5)
RX2 =
βH→V
βH→H
(A.6)
Combing (A.2), (A.4) and (A.5), we can write,
βHejϕ
H
= RC1β
V→V ejϕ1 +RX1βV→V ejϕ2 (A.7)
Combing (A.3) and (A.6), we can write,
βV ejϕ
V
= βV→V ejϕ3 +RX2RC1βV→V ejϕ4 (A.8)
From (A.7), (A.8) and (A.1), we can now write,
βejϕ = βV→V {ejϕ3 +RC1ejϕ1 +RX1ejϕ2
+RX2RC1e
jϕ4} (A.9)
= ζβV→V (A.10)
where ζ denotes the complex number to the right of βV→V in (A.9). By drawing the
phase angles ϕs uniformly from [0, 2pi), we can compute, ζ. Given β, we can now
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express βV→V as:
βV→V = β/|ζ| (A.11)
= ρ3β (A.12)
Subsequently through (A.4), (A.5) and (A.6) βH→H , βV→H , and βH→V can be
expressed as:
βH→H = ρ1β (A.13)
βV→H = ρ2β (A.14)
βH→V = ρ4β (A.15)
Finally using (A.2) and (A.3), we can find βH and βV :
βH = (ρ1βe
jϕ1 + ρ2βe
jϕ2)/ejϕ
H
= ξβ (A.16)
βV = (ρ3βe
jϕ3 + ρ4βe
jϕ4)/ejϕ
V
= β (A.17)
181
Appendix B: Channel Sounding with Vector Network
Analyzer
A vector network analyzer (VNA) is an extremely versatile instrument that is used
to characterize microwave devices in terms of their complex (amplitude and phase)
network parameters. The most common parameter form that is measured by a VNA
is the s-parameter. Other measurable parameters include y-parameters, z-parameters,
and h-parameters.
The VNA used for all the antenna characterization and channel sounding exper-
iments reported in this thesis is an Agilent N5230A. The key specifications of this
device is listed in table B.1.
The wireless channel including the transmit and receive antennas can be con-
sidered as a two port device which enables channel sounding using a VNA in the
frequency domain. The important steps in measuring the wireless channel for the
scenario described in chapters 5 and 6 are shown in Fig. B.1.
The steps involved in setting up a VNA for channel measurements are listed below:
1. The cables leading to the three terminals (R , T and I) are connected to the
VNA ports (1, 2 and 3 respectively for purposes of this discussion).
2. Amplitude and phase traces are setup for S21 and S23. In this setup S21 char-
acterizes the R-T channel and S23 characterizes the R - I channel. Appropriate
values for the following parameters are specified during this phase: center fre-
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Table B.1: N5230A Specifications
Parameter Specification
Number of ports 2/4
Frequency range 300kHz - 20GHz
Highest frequency resolution 1Hz
Number of measurement points 1 - 20,001
Measurement bandwidths 10 Hz to 500 kHz
Dynamic Range varies between 108 and 129 dB
Measurement time (@ 10GHz center frequency and 100MHz span)
1Hz IF BW – 178s
1kHz IF BW – 187ms
10kHz IF BW – 24ms
100Hz IF BW – 2.1(ms)
Measurement accuracy (dB) S21 – < 0.1dB and 1
o @ 10dB
S11 – < 0.04 and 2
o @ 1(linear)
Power range -30 to 20 dBm
Trace noise of S21 @ 2.4 GHz 0.04 dB RMS
Noise floor @ 2.4 GHz < -105 dBm
Test port impedance 50 Ω
Connector Type N
Data transfer time (SCPI via LAN,
201 points)
32-bit – 6ms, 64-bit – 10ms, ASCII - 53ms
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Port  1 (T)  Port  2 (R) 
THRU 
Port  2 (R)  Port  3 (I) 
(b) 
(a) 
(c) 
Ethernet 
R  T  I 
Figure B.1: Important steps in measuring the wireless channel for the scenario
described in chapters 5 and 6. (a) THRU calibration to remove cable effects for
S21 (R - T channel) measurements. (b) THRU calibration to remove cable effects
for S23 (R - I channel) measurements. (c) Execute and store complex S21 and S23
measurements from the control PC via SCPI commands.
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quency, span, number of measurement points, output power on both transmit
ports, IF bandwidth, and sample averaging.
3. The system is calibrated to remove cable effects in S21 measurements by directly
connecting the cables leading up to R and T, followed by a THRU calibration
(Figure B.1a). Similarly corrections for S23 are made by connecting the cables
leading up to R and I (Figure B.1b). Then the calibration state is stored as a
‘.csa’ state file in the VNA filesystem.
4. Next the appropriate antennas are connected to the cables (whip antennas to
the T and I terminals and the reconfigurable antenna to the R terminal and
place at the desired locations within the measurement environment.
5. A PC running SCPI commands to trigger measurements on the VNA and record
them is connected to the VNA via an Ethernet connection. A remote GPIB
connection that emulates a GPIB connection to the VNA over an Ethernet link
is created using the Agilent IO library suite running on the host PC. SCPI
commands are then sent and received from the the PC to the VNA through
Matlab which uses the visa drivers to communicate over this remote GPIB
connection.
6. At each measurement instant, the PC loads the stored calibration file, cycles
through the different states of the reconfigurable antenna using the antenna’s
driver board and records the complex S21 and S23 values in parallel.
7. Steps (4) - (6) are repeated for every combination of R, T, I locations.
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For the 2 × 2 MIMO channel measurements reported in chapter 4, the two trans-
mit antennas were connected to ports 1 and 2, while the two receiver antennas were
connected to ports 3 and 4. The quantities of interest in this setup are S23, S32, S41
and S42. Calibration and the remaining steps remain the same as listed above.
Two 75 feet low loss RF coaxial cables (50 Ω, 0.15 dB/foot loss@ 2.5GHz) were
used to connect the transmit antennas to the VNA. The receive antenna was co-
located with the VNA and connected using a much shorter cable. A power amplifier
at the transmit antenna side or a low noise amplifier at the receive side can be
introduced to compensate for cable losses and improve SNR. However the noise floor
of the VNA was low enough to avoid using amplifiers for all the measured links.
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Appendix C: Reconfigurable Leaky Wave Antenna (RLWA)
A leaky-wave antenna is a wave-guiding / transmission line structure that possesses
a mechanism to leak power all along its length in a controlled manner[185]. The leak-
age constant component α of its wave propagation constant controls the antenna’s
beamwidth while the phase constant β controls its beam direction. Traditional trans-
mission lines can exhibit only positive phase velocities and therefore leaky wave an-
tennas derived from such structures are able to achieve beam scanning only from
end-fire to broadside directions as illustrated in Fig. C.1a.
However composite right/left-hand (CRLH) metamaterial transmission lines are
capable of producing both positive and negative phase velocities [166]. To achieve
this behavior, individual unit cells are constructed by inserting an artificial series
capacitance and a shunt inductance into a conventional microstrip transmission line
by means of an interdigital capacitor and a shorted stub respectively. The RLWA
employed in this thesis is an antenna built by cascading these metamaterial unit cells
[186]. The resulting antenna, shown in Fig. C.2, is capable of scanning the beam
from end-fire to end-fire directions as shown in Fig. C.1b. To dynamically tune
phase velocity and thus the resulting beam direction, two varactor diodes are placed
in parallel with the interdigital capacitor, and one in series with the shunt inductor.
The two sets of varactor diodes are independently biased (S and SH ) for better tuning
resolution and impedance matching.
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(a)
(b)
Figure C.1: (a) Traditional leaky wave antennas can scan their beam only from
end-fire to broadside directions. The metamaterial inspired leaky wave antenna
can scan its beam from end-fire to end-fire directions.
SH
S
Figure C.2: Two-port RLWA
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The antenna also has two ports that can serve as a two element antenna array.
Sufficient number of unit cells (25) are placed between the ports to facilitate maximum
radiation from both ports and maintain an acceptable level of isolation between them.
A driver board specifically designed for tuning the bias voltages S and SH is used
for computer control of the RLWA. The board is capable of sweeping each bias voltage
level from 2.5 V to 40 V in 28 steps. i.e., the antenna can be tuned to a total of 216
different states. To do so, the board’s microcontroller accepts a 16 bit word (8 bits
for S and 8 bits for SH ) via the I/O port and sets the state of a digital potentiometer
appropriately to achieve the desired voltage. The mapping from voltage state to beam
direction was done through manual radiation pattern measurements for a set of states
in the Drexel anechoic chamber.
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Appendix D: HYDRA Software Defined Radio Testbed
HYDRA is a software defined radio testbed that is designed to support MIMO-OFDM
communications [175]. Each node consists of three main components: a pair of RF
front ends and frequency agile RF transceivers (RCS 110) to support 2 × 2 MIMO
communications (can be expanded up to four), a baseband data acquisition system
and a general purpose PC that implements the MAC and all the layers above it. An
image of the node and the schematic of the MAC and physical layers are shown in
Fig. D.1 and D.2 respectively.
Figure D.1: HYDRA SDR Node
During reception, signals from the RF front-end are digitized by the PXI data
acquisition cards from National Instruments. The A/D and D/A converters operate at
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Figure D.2: Schematic of the MAC and physical layer of a HYDRA SDR tesbed
node.
100 MS/s with 14-bit quantization. The digitized signals are processed by a processor
(PXI-8186) on which the physical layer is implemented via LabView. The processor
and PXI data acquisition cards together constitute the baseband chassis. MAC and
higher layer protocol functionalities are implemented by the general purpose computer
to which the chassis processor passes the baseband data via an Ethernet connection.
Different modulation schemes from BPSK up to 64 QAM can be implemented in
software.
During transmission, analog signals generated by the PXI cards are modulated
using OFDM with 64 sub-carriers that span a bandwidth of 22MHz out of which
52 are alloted for data. The remaining carriers are used for training. The spacing
between each sub carrier is 312.5 KHz. The RF transceivers are capable of operating
on all channels in the Industrial, Science, and Medicine (ISM) band between 2.4
and 2.5 GHz and the Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure (UNII) band
between 4.9 and 5.9 GHz.
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Appendix E: WARP Software Defined Radio Testbed
WARP is a scalable and extensible programmable SDR platform built from the ground
up to prototype advanced wireless networks. It is developed and distributed by Rice
University. WARP hardware consists of two major components: digital baseband
processing and analog RF processing. The digital baseband processing is all done on
the main system board which houses a Xilinx Virtex II Pro FPGA which handles all
physical and MAC layer functionality. The main board contains four sets of connec-
tors which provide a set of digital connections to four possible daughter cards that fit
onto the main board. These daughter cards implement RF transceivers based on the
802.11a/g standard and provide the option for choosing between the ISM or UNII
bands and their specific channels. Along with the hardware, a full set of reference
designs for different PHY and MAC layer protocols are also available. Combined to-
gether, the system forms an easily implemented real-time SDR communication system
that can be expanded to include much more functionality.
There are two primary operating modes that can be employed for investigating
physical layer algorithms in WARP. In non-real time mode, WARP uses WarpLab, a
Matlab frontend that makes real-time use of the channel but relegates all transmitter
and receiver processing to oﬄine processing in MATLAB running on a host computer.
This mode can be used to rapidly prototype and evaluate any new algorithms that is
being studied. All measurements reported in this thesis were performed in this mode.
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(a) (b)
Figure E.1: (a) A WARP SDR Node (b) WARP daughter card that implements
the RF transceivers
In real-time mode, a full implementation of the studied algorithms can be directly
programmed onto the FPGA on the WARP digital baseband processing board. When
operating in this mode a WARP node acts as a transparent wireless Ethernet bridge
that connects via Ethernet to a computer. As the computer sends Ethernet packets
over the network, the WARP nodes perform all the custom algorithm functions pro-
grammed into the FPGA, encapsulate the packet as the payload for a WARP defined
packet structure and sends it over the air to other nodes. The intended node will
receive the WARP packet, de-encapsulate the packet and send it to the receiving
computer via an Ethernet connection.
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